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Introduction 
The trade-employment relationship in Indonesia is of  particular interest 
for a number of  reasons. First, Indonesia is a large country. With a pop- 
ulation of  approximately 140 million  (1978), it is the third largest de- 
veloping country in the world  after China and India. The sheer size of 
its domestic market would allow it to produce a wide range of  commodi- 
ties if  the state intervened sufficiently in trade. Second, Indonesia has a 
rapidly  expanding labor force. It is projected to increase by nearly  12 
million  (or  29  percent)  over  the  decade  1971-81  (BPS, Statistical 
Pocketbook, 1974-75,  p.  68). By  the year 2000 the total labor force 
will more than double, and the urban labor force may quadruple relative 
to 1970 levels  (Speare 1978, p. 99). Providing productive employment 
for this burgeoning labor force  presents  Indonesia  with  difficult chal- 
lenges over the coming decades, and employment creation is given high- 
est priority in planning documents. Third, real gross domestic product 
increased at a relatively rapid pace (7.2 percent per annum) from 1968 
to 1976. Much of this growth was due to recovery from a lengthy period 
of  economic  mismanagement  and  stagnation  and to the rapid  growth 
of  the petroleum sector and other extractive sectors. Over the same pe- 
riod, manufacturing value added grew at an average rate of  l l .1 percent 
and increased  its  share of GDP to 11.1 percent  in  1976. Fourth, the 
dearth of  prior research evaluating the Indonesian trade regime and its 
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effect on  resource  allocation  has  heretofore  precluded  comparison  of 
the Indonesian experience with that of  other developing countries. 
Finally, the nature of the trade-employment relationship is of  particu- 
lar policy  relevance  in  the  Indonesian case.  Indonesia  appears to be 
approaching a key juncture in its trade regime. Since the dramatic trade 
liberalization  of  the  late  1960s, Indonesia  has had  a  relatively  open 
foreign sector with full exchange convertibility and the complete absence 
of  foreign exchange licensing. Attracted in part by the wide array of  fiscal 
and  tariff  incentives  offered  to domestic  and  foreign investment,  new 
investment has played an important role in postliberalization growth. In 
manufacturing,  foreign  investment  contributed  nearly  half  of  all new 
investment between  1967 and 1973. Much of  this investment took place 
in  activities where protection  was greatest or where entry of  new firms 
was controlled. Recent events indicate that the growth of  manufacturing 
investment and output may be expected to slow in coming years. Excess 
capacity  has already become  a significant problem  in  many  industries 
and has led to calls for increased protection. The government’s response 
has  been  to increase quantitative restrictions  on imports and to state 
publicly that it believes imports should not be permitted unless domestic 
production is fully utilized  (Grenville 1977, p. 25). Another sign of  a 
future slowdown in  the growth  of  manufacturing  is the decline in  the 
rates  of  both new foreign and private domestic investment.  The recent 
economic climate has prompted some observers to deem Indonesia “one 
of the least attractive foreign  investment sites of  Asia, particularly  out- 
side of  the extractive sector” (Arndt 1977,  p.  13).  Nevertheless, public- 
sector  enterprises  seem  to be enjoying vigorous  growth.  Hopes of  in- 
creased  exports  of  manufactures,  however,  have  not  materialized.  In 
spite of  a higher rate of  inflation relative to its trading partners  (includ- 
ing the  United  States), large  oil  earnings  have  permitted  the  rupiah 
exchange  rate vis-8-vis  the  dollar  to  remain  unchanged  since  1971, 
thereby raising the relative  costs of  actual and potential manufactured 
exports. Thus, the seeds for a more inward-oriented manufacturing de- 
velopment strategy exist. The trade-employment  relationship  examined 
here for the year  1971 is for an economy whose trade regime may be 
entering a new phase. 
5.1  The Indonesian Economy since 1950 
5.1.1  Phases in Indonesian Economic Growth 
From 1950,l when Indonesians took complete control of their govern- 
ment from the Dutch, until the present time the Indonesian economy has 
gone  through  four phases,  roughly  delineated  by  the  years  1950-57, 
1958-65,  1966-71,  and 1972 to the present. 183  Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment in Indonesia 
1950-57 
1950 marked the end of  a decade during which Indonesia was first 
subject to Japanese occupation and then engaged in a struggle for inde- 
pendence. The next seven years were a period of  reconstruction. Rates 
of real per capita income growth were low but positive. The end of  the 
commodity  price boom  after  the Korean  War  necessitated  a dramatic 
reduction  of  imports  from  their  heady  levels  of  1951-52.  This  was 
accomplished by  imposing  quantitative restrictions  and by  introducing 
a number of  trade devices that were to be employed again and again over 
the next dozen years : import entitlement schemes, prepayment  require- 
ments, and import surcharges. The government relied heavily on taxes on 
trade, which contributed an average of  more than 40 percent of  net gov- 
ernment revenue over the period. At the same time, rising government 
budget  deficits  led  to inflation,  which  reached  double-digit  levels  by 
1955. 
Although  good  data  are  unavailable,  manufacturing  value  added 
probably grew somewhat faster than GDP over this period. High levels 
of protection  were provided by  quotas and high tariff  rates on finished 
consumer  goods  and by  low  duty  rates  on  raw  materials  and capital 
goods. Industries regarded as essential received priority in the allocation 
of  foreign exchange. Government agencies were established to distribute 
some raw  materials,  such  as weaving  yarns,  at subsidized  prices.  One 
result was an expansion of  capacity in the presence of its underutilization 
because  raw  material  allocation  among firms was based  on their  pro- 
ductive capacity  (Suhadi 1967, p. 225). The “essential” industries that 
received  priority  in the allocation of  foreign exchange utilized  only 60 
percent of capacity in 1958, less essential industries operated at only 20 
percent of  capacity, and manufacturing as a whole operated at about 40 
percent (Suhadi 1967, p. 225). 
1958-65 
The period  1950-57  came to an  end after the last  and broadest  of 
several short liberalization attempts that characterized the period. Tem- 
porary liberalization of  the highly restrictive import-licensing system was 
achieved through the Bukti Ekspor (literally, “proof of  export”) system 
(BE), an import entitlement scheme, introduced in June 1957. The BE 
system was ended when President Sukarno set out to implement his con- 
cept of “guided economy” based  on an aversion to foreign capital and 
the market process. Because of  economic mismanagement, 195  8-65  was 
economically dismal by  any measure.  Per capita national product was 
below its  1958 level in all the succeeding years of  this phase. Inflation 
intensified to three-digit  magnitudes by  1  962.2 Import restrictions con- 
tinued,  and  exports suffered  since the effective exchange rate  (EER) 184  Mark M. Pitt 
was not adjusted as rapidly  as domestic prices were rising. With export 
receipts  falling,  cuts in  imports  were necessary.  Food shortages man- 
dated the use of much of  the available foreign exchange for food imports. 
As a result, imports of  raw materials were cut back drastically. 
At the end of  this period of  trade restriction  and economic misman- 
agement,  Indonesia  found  herself  in  desperate  economic  straits.  The 
average price level in 1966  was more than 1,000 percent of  that in 1965. 
Total foreign debt at the end of  1965 was almost $2.4 billion, much of 
it owed  to the Soviet Union  for  military  equipment. Debt  repayment 
due in 1966 was $530 million-78  percent of  the value of  exports in 
that year. Recorded values of  imports and exports were below the aver- 
age levels of  the ten previous years. Domestic manufacturing was operat- 
ing  at only  20-30  percent  of  capacity, and  government rice  godowns 
(storage)  were empty following the prohibition of  further rice imports 
decreed by President Sukarno in 1964. 
1966-71 
After  an  abortive coup on 30 September  1965, a new  government 
emerged,  headed  by  General  (later President)  Suharto, which  relied 
heavily  on a group of  Western-trained  economists. Beginning in  1966, 
they embarked on a successful program of  stabilization and trade liberal- 
ization  and achieved  remarkable  economic  growth  in spite of  the ob- 
stacles present when the program began. 
Indonesian  national  product data for the decade of  the 1950s and 
early  1960s are notoriously poor.  The available  data indicate that per 
capita rates of  growth turned negative in the late 1950s. It is estimated 
that per capita product in  1963 was 7 percent less than it was five years 
earlier  (Nugroho 1967, p. 450). It was not until at least 1968 that per 
capita product reached  the levels achieved in the 1950s. Thereafter,  as 
noted  above, real GDP grew relatively rapidly, with growth most pro- 
nounced  in exports and manufacturing. During the early  1960s manu- 
facturing’s share of  GDP had actually fallen marginally  (see table 5.1), 
and real manufacturing  value  added  in  1966 was  less  than  it was  in 
1961. After  1968 manufacturing  value  added  grew  two-thirds  fasteI 
than GDP. 
During the late 1950s and early  1960s, restrictions on imports of  raw 
materials  resulted  in  excess  capacity  and  a  declining  share  of  total 
manufacturing  value  added  for those  sectors dependent  on imported 
inputs and spare parts. As table 5.2 illustrates, the share of  manufactur- 
ing value added  originating in importable  activities  (defined  simply as 
all sectors except the manufacture  of  food, beverages,  tobacco, wood, 
and  rubber)  declined  dramatically  throughout  the  period  of  import 
stringency but increased after liberalization began. 185  Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment in Indonesia 
Table 5.1  Gross Domestic Product by  Industrial Origin and by 
Expenditure Category, 1960-76 























































GDP by Expenditure Category 
(Current Market Prices) 
Private consumption expenditure 
General government 
Gross domestic capital formation 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic product 
consumption expenditure 
1960-64  1965-69 
83.4%  90.4% 
8.7  7.3 
8.8  8.0 
9.9  9.3 
-  10.8  -  15.0 
100.0  100.0 
1970-74  1975-76 
73.6%  68.4% 
9.6  10.1 
16.5  20.5 
18.2  22.3 
-17.9  -21.3 
100.0  100.0 
Source:  Biro Pusat Statistik (1969, 2:519); Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistical  Pocker- 
book of Indonesia,  1974-75,  p. 512; Arndt  (1977, p.  31). 
Note: There are no comparable figures before  1958. 
"At 1960 prices. 
"At 1973 prices. 
~Prelirninary. 
The low rate of  growth during the 1960s can be attributed in part to 
the low rate of  gross domestic capital formation. Data on GDP by type 
of  expenditure,  given  in  table  5.1,  show that  gross  domestic  capital 
formation was only 8.8 percent of  GDP in  1960-64  and 8.0 percent in 
1965-69.  Spurred by the economy's new health and the growth of  the 
extractive sectors,  the rate of  capital formation  more  than  doubled  in 
1970-74  over the preceding period and rose even further in 1975-76. 
1972 to the Present 
Indonesia's  high rate of  growth has continued since  1972, thanks  in 
large part to a continuation of  its relatively liberal policies. As I men- 
tioned  above, real  GDP grew  at a relatively  rapid  rate of  7.2 percent 
annually from 1968 to 1976 while manufacturing grew at an even faster 
annual  rate of  about 11 percent. Consequently its share in  GDP rose 
from 9 to 11 percent from 1971 to 1976. 
Nonetheless, policies in recent  years have  regressed from their rela- 
tive liberalness in  the prior period.  For example,  recent  studies  (e.g., 186  Mark M. Pitt 
Table 5.2  Share of  Import-Competing Sectors in Total Manufacturing 
Value Added and Employment 
1958  1961  1963  1966  1971  1972 
Value Added 
Large establishmentsa  48.7%  47.5%  28.4%  12.6%  26.5%  - 
Large and medium establishments  -  -  31.9  18.8  35.9  37.1 
Employment 
Large and medium establishments  -  -  41.8  40.2  32.2  34.7 
Source: Biro  Pusat Statistik, Pendapatan  nasional Indonesia  1958-62; Biro  Pusat 
Statistik,  Pendapatan  nasional  Indonesia  1960-68;  Biro  Pusat  Statistik,  Statistik 
industri (1971 and 1972). 
Note: “Import-competing  sectors”  here  includes  all  manufacturing  except  food 
products, beverages, tobacco, wood products, and rubber products. These products 
account for the remainder  of  manufacturing value added and employment. 
aLarge establishments are defined as enterprises without mechanical power employ- 
ing 100 or more persons or with mechanical power employing 50 or more persons. 
Medium  establishments  are defined as enterprises without  mechanical  power  em- 
ploying  10-99  persons or with mechanical power employing 5-49  persons. 
Large establishments  54.5%  68.9%  36.5%  36.8%  26.0%  - 
Grenville 1977, p. 25) report that there have been substantial increases 
in import duty  collections.  Quantitative restrictions, duty prepayment, 
and restricted credit access now  apply  to imports of  textiles and some 
other commodities.  Thus,  as I suggested in the introduction,  Indonesia 
is at a crucial juncture in its development. 
5.1.2  International Trade 
Trade Patterns 
Table 5.3 shows the changing composition of  Indonesia’s exports and 
highlights the importance of  two commodities, rubber and petroleum, in 
totaI  exports. Rubber was dominant in the 1950s, when it constituted 
more than 50 percent of  export returns. With  dramatically higher pro- 
duction and prices, petroleum has recently dominated exports, account- 
ing for almost three-quarters of  export proceeds in 1975. By 1972 rub- 
ber had fallen to third among export commodities, overtaken by rapidly 
growing exports of  forest products. Table 5.4 presents greater detail on 
the commodity composition of  Indonesian exports in 1960-62  and 1970- 
72. The table also shows the contributions of  different manufacturing 
sectors broadly  defined  to include  all  HOS  exportables  (as classified 
below in section 5.3).3 (This breakdown is confined to 1971, being de- 
rived from the input-output  table for that year.)  So  defined, exports of 
manufactures  consisted  mainly  of processed  agricultural  and  forestry 
products,  among which smoked  and remilled rubber  was the dominant 
item. Table 5.3  Composition of  Exports and Imports, 1950-76  (in Millions of  Dollars and in Percent) 
Exports  Imports 








421.3  (45) 
348.9 (38) 
341.2  (41) 
250.3 (36) 
198.5 (27) 
263.9  (14) 
457.4 (6) 
Petroleum 
174.1  (18) 
247.3  (27) 
262.4  (32) 
255.9  (36) 
280.8  (38) 
861.5  (47) 
5,534.0  (72) 
Other 
351.7  (37) 
316.9  (35) 
225.2  (27) 
196.7  (28) 
252.8  (35) 












358.6  (48) 
259.0  (35) 
198.1  (33) 
215.6  (34) 
236.1  (35) 
340.5  (21) 
766.8  (16) 
Raw  Capital 
Materials  Goods 
266.5  (35)  131.2 (17) 
328.4  (45)  142.7  (20) 
266.8  (44)  135.2  (23) 
219.8  (35)  200.4  (31) 
249.6  (38)  182.3  (27) 
593.9  (37)  664.5  (42) 









Source: Biro Pusat Xtatistik, Ekspor (various issues). 
Note:  Figures are annual averages for the years indicated. Table 5.4  Composition of Exports 
Composition of Total Exports by Main Commodities 
commodity 
1960-62  1970-72 
Millions  Millions 
of $  %  of $  % 
Rubber 
Petroleum and derivatives 
Tin ore concentrate 
Copra and copra cakes 
Tea 


































































of  $  % 
Smoking and remilling of rubber (94)  262.1  57 
Coffee grinding (58)  55.3  1 
Vegetable and animal oils and fats (50)  51.4  1 
Processed tobacco (64)  15.2  4 
Dried cassava and tapioca flour (53)  15.0  3 
Coconut oil and cooking oil (49)  12.1  3 
Tanneries and leather finishing (74)  5.7  1 
Batik industries (69)  1.1  4: 
Other manufacturing industries  7.1  2 
Tea processing (59)  28.9  6 
Sawmills, planing, and other wood processing (77)  1.9  * 
Canning and preserving of fish and other seafoods (48)  *  1.7 
Total  457.4 
Sources: Commodity exports:  Biro Pusat Statistik, Ekspor (various issues) ;  sector 
exports:  unpublished  197  1 input-output  table for  Indonesia  constructed  by  Biro 
Pusat Statistik.  (See also note 14.) 
*Less than 0.5 percent. 
LIncludes only exports of  sectors classified as HOS exportables  (see Section  5.3). 
Numbers in parentheses refer  to input-output  code, as in table  5.A.1.  Trade data 
from the input-output table are not always consistent with official trade figures. For 
example, the  table  indicates that exports from the  rubber  milling  sector  exceed 
official commodity  exports of  all  rubber.  No  explanation  for this  discrepancy  is 
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Indonesia’s import composition (see table 5.3) has reflected the orien- 
tation  of  the trade regime. During the 1950s raw materials were more 
than 45 percent  of  total imports,  reflecting the priority  in foreign ex- 
change  allocation given the sheltered manufacturing  sector.  However, 
raw  material  imports  suffered most  when  imports had  to  be reduced 
because of  decreased export earnings in the early 1960s. They fell from 
an average annual level of  $328 million in  1954-57  to $220 million in 
1962-65.  With increased availability of  foreign exchange in the 1970s, 
all imports grew, but capital goods imports grew the fastest, reflecting 
in  part the high  level  of  capital  formation.  Capital  goods imports  in 
1974-76  made up 45 percent of  total imports and were nearly  twelve 
times their dollar volume in 1966-69. 
The pattern of  commodity trade by country has also altered substan- 
tially in recent years. Of  particular note is the increased importance of 
Japan as a  trading  partner. Japan’s  share of  Indonesia’s  exports  rose 
from 6 to 46 percent from 1960-62  to 1970-72.  Much of  this increase 
is due to Japan’s position  as the major importer  of  Indonesia’s  crude 
petroleum;  nevertheless,  Japan’s  share of  nonoil  exports  in  1970-72 
was more than 22 percent. Japan also became Indonesia’s largest source 
of  imports, accounting for almost one-third of  the total in 1970-72.  The 
share  of  imports  from  LDCs  (including  Singapore  and  Malaysia) 
doubled between  1960-62  and 1970-72 to account for a quarter of  the 
import total. 
Balance of Payments 
Table 5.5 gives data on Indonesia’s balance of  payments for selected 
years  over the period  1960-76.  In these years  the trade balance was 
always in surplus, while the goods and services balance was always in 
deficit. Much of  the recent  growth  in  the services deficit is due to in- 
creased profit remittances of  foreign-owned firms. Private capital inflows 
became substantial in the early  1970s and were almost $500 million in 
1973. The  1975-76  net  private  capital  outflow principally  represents 
short-term debt repayment by PERTAMINA (the state-owned oil com- 
pany) ,  balanced to some extent by loans that appear on the official trans- 
fers and capital account. 
The Trade Regime 
Here I attempt  to summarize salient  features  of  Indonesia’s  highly 
complex trade policies. A longer discussion is found in section 5.2. 
In the  1960s Indonesia’s  trade  regime  was  characterized by  (1) a 
system equivalent to legal underinvoicing designed to subsidize exports; 
(2) foreign exchange allocation based upon the degree of  their “neces- 
sity” of  imports, either as consumption goods  (e.g.,  rice, pharmaceuti- 190  MarkM.Pitt 
Table 5.5  Indonesia’s Balance of  Payments, Selected Years 1960 to 
1975-76  (Millions of U.S. Dollars) 





Goods and services balance 
Special drawing rights 
Private capital 
Official transfers and capital 










































Sources:  Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics (various issues). 
“Fiscal year  1 April to 31 March. 
bNet of  oil imports. 
cNon-oil imports. 
cals)  or as intermediate inputs;  (3) chronic overvaluation  of  the ex- 
change rate because of  the high rate of  inflation; and (4) the existence 
of  widespread  smuggling. In the late 1960s the system was simplified, 
foreign  exchange controls were  lifted,  the exchange rate structure was 
unified,  and  legal  underinvoicing  was  eliminated. Thus,  by  the  early 
1970s (the focus of  the study) the trade regime had become relatively 
liberal.  Foreign  exchange  controls  no longer  existed  and, in  general, 
protection  was  moderate.  The structure  of  protection  had  a  definite 
import substitution bias. ERPs were highest for importables and low, if 
not negative,  for exportables. Since the early  1970s, policies have be- 
come more  restrictive  (as mentioned  earlier)  although not enough  to 
eliminate their general open and liberal character. 
Exchange Rates 
The existence of  chronic inflation has meant that exchange rates have 
been chronically overvalued and that a substantial share of  international 
trade  occurred  through  illegal  channels  (see  section  5.2 for details). 
From 1950 to 1972, prices rose by a factor of  42,000; that is, in 1972 
prices  were 42,000 times  greater  than  they  were  in  1950! The black 
market  exchange  rate  has  been  consistently  above  the effective  rate, 
with differentials ranging  from 10 to over  1,100 percent. Currency de- 
valuations have occurred only infrequently  (except for a period of  float- 
ing rates from 1967 to 1970), causing wide variation in price level de- 
flated effective exchange rates. However, since liberalization in the late 
1960s, the  degree of  overvaluation has been  small  relative  to  that  of 
the 1950s and early 1960s. 191  Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment in Indonesia 
5.1.3  The Structure of  Production 
Like most developing countries, Indonesia is heavily dependent upon 
NRB production.  Close to 50 percent of  GDP originates in NRB pro- 
duction, and about 80 percent of  the population is found in rural areas. 
However,  the  relative importance  of  NRB production  has  decreased 
while  that  of  manufacturing  has  increased,  especially  since  the  late 
1960s. In 1971 manufacturing produced  about 9 percent of  GDP and 
employed 6 percent of  the labor force. 
Most  manufacturing  activities  are  located  in  import  substitution 
activities. Activities categorized as importables  (see section 5.3 for de- 
tails)  generated nearly  60 percent of  domestic value added  (DVA) in 
manufacturing  (excluding  petroleum  refining).  Exportables  generated 
40 percent of  DVA, and production that did not compete with imports 
generated about 1 percent of  DVA. Most importable activities could be 
classified as processed  food  and consumer goods industries.  Major ex- 
portables  consist  of  processed  NRB goods,  for example, canned  fish, 
sawmill products, and milled rubber. 
5.1.4  The lndonesian Labor Market 
Growth and Structure 
Indonesia’s  population  growth  rate  is  not  high  in  comparison with 
that  of  other large  developing  countries. It averaged  2.1  percent  per 
annum  over  the  period  1961-71,  substantially  less  than Brazil’s  and 
Pakistan’s 2.9 percent and Thailand’s 3.0 percent but only slightly less 
than India’s 2.3 percent. The labor force growth rate of  1.8 percent has 
been less than that of  population. The share of  population under fifteen 
years of  age stood at 44 percent in  1971, and 61 percent of  those ten 
years of  age or older were literate. 
As I  mentioned  above, the Indonesian  labor force is still primarily 
rural and agricultural. According to the 197  1 population  census  (Pen- 
duduk Indonesia), only 14.7 percent of  the 1971 labor force was urban, 
and 6.2 percent  of  the total labor force was engaged in manufacturing 
compared with 60 percent in agriculture. The manufacturing labor force 
in urban areas  was  only  23 percent  of  the total manufacturing  labor 
force in 1971. Indeed, according to official figures, the urban manufac- 
turing labor force declined in absolute terms from 1961 to 1971 while 
the rural manufacturing labor  force nearly  doubled.  Sundrum  (1975, 
pp.  60-62)  has  adjusted  this population  census data to reflect differ- 
ences in the definition of  an “urban area” between  1961 and 1971. His 
adjusted figures reveal an absolute increase in the urban manufacturing 
labor force (of 46 percent compared with rural’s 59 percent); however, 
the share of  the manufacturing labor force in urban areas still declined 
(from 36.9  to  33.9  percent). This may  be a reflection of  the decline 192  Mark M. Pitt 
of  import-competing  sectors  during the  1960s (see table  5.2), since 
these  sectors were  composed  of  firms that  were  more urban than  the 
agricultural processing  sectors that  composed the remainder  of  manu- 
facturing.  Most evidence indicates that this trend has been halted  and 
probably reversed during the 1970s. 
Over the period  1961-71,  manufacturing employment grew at a 3.3 
percent annual rate and increased its share in total employment from 5.7 
to 6.8 per~ent.~  Table 5.6 provides the data. This rate of  growth was not 
constant  over  time.  During  the period  of  greatest  economic  decline 
Table 5.6  Labor Market Conditions in Indonesia 
Rates of  Growth 









Population (millions)  97.4  105.4  120.1  1.97  2.18 
Labor force (thousands)  34,578  36,543  41,261  1.38  2.02 
Employment (thousands)  32.709  35,698  37,628  2.19  0.88  --  .. 
Manufacturing employ- 
ment (thousands)  1,856 
Manufacturing value- 
added (Rp billion, con- 
stant 1960 prices) 
Large and medium 
enterprises  24.5 
Total  36.6 
Small enterprises  12.1 
Real annual wage in manu- 
facturing (thousands of 
1973 rupiahs) : 
Large enterprises  69.5 
Medium enterprises  35.0 
Rate of unemployment (%)  5.4 
Elasticity of manufac- 
turing employment (with 
respect to value added) 







41.8 -1.91  10.18 
15.8  1.21  3.64 
57.6 -0.69  8.02 
74.1 -7.54  6.10 
37.6 -9.96  7.83 
8.8 











Sources:  Row  1 : Biro Pusat  Statistik, Statistical  Pocketbook of  Indonesia,  1974- 
75, p. 23. 
Row 2:  1961: Biro Pusat Statistik  (1963), p.  12; 1965: Biro Pusat Statistik (1967), 
p.  1; 1971: Biro Pusat Statistik (1975), p.  218. 
Row 3: 1961: Biro Pusat Statistik (1963), p.  12; 1965: Biro Pusat Statistik (1967), 
p.  1; 1971: Biro Pusat Statistik (1975), p.  166. 
Row 4:  1961: Biro Pusat Statistik (1963), p.  32; 1965: Biro Pusat Statistik (1967), 
p. 37; 1971: Biro Pusat Statistik (1975), pp. 218-19. 
Row 5: Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistical  Pocketbook of  Indonesia,  various  issues. 
Row 6: Table 5.7. 
Row 7: (Row 2 -  row 3) f  (row 2). Figures are not comparable over time. 
Row 8: Calculated as the change in manufacturing employment (row 4) divided by 
the change in manufacturing  value added (row 5)  over the same time period. 193  Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment in Indonesia 
( 1961-65),  the growth  rate of  manufacturing  employment  was some- 
what slower than in the succeeding period of  economic advance (1965- 
71  ). However, the increase in manufacturing employment during 1961- 
65 coincided  with  an absolute  decline  in manufacturing  employment. 
This phenomenon may be explained by a number of  factors. First, labor 
productivity  tends to fall as excess capacity rises because  firms find it 
more difficult to lay off  labor relative to capital. Second, the 26 percent 
fall  in  real  manufacturing  wages  paid  by  large-scale  firms  over  this 
period may have led to factor substitution. Third, employment may have 
risen  because  the  composition  of  output  shifted  dramatically  toward 
more labor-intensive sectors. Table 5.2 indicates that the share of  import- 
competing  sectors  in  total  large  firm  value  added  and  employment 
declined  from 47.5  to 28.4 percent  and from 68.9  to 36.8 percent  re- 
spectively between  1961 and  1966. It would  be expected that import- 
competing sectors would have  a smaller  labor requirement per unit of 
domestic value added than other sectors. The evidence presented in sec- 
tion 5.4 bears out the validity of  this assertion for 1971. Also note that 
the fall in manufacturing value added is entirely attributable to large and 
medium-size firms and that small firm output actually increased. Small 
firms  in  Indonesia  are substantially  more  labor-intensive  than  larger 
firms.5 
Wage Behavior 
The Indonesian  labor market  has operated in the absence of  signifi- 
cant government intervention. It was not until 1975 that ,minimum wage 
regulations were enacted, and even these regulations  covered a limited 
set of  industries in certain regions. A law enacted in 1964 required pri- 
vate firms to obtain government  approval before dismissing more than 
ten workers and to pay indemnity. The number of  employees covered by 
this  act  was  relatively  small,  and  according  to  Arndt  and  Sundrum 
(1975, p. 377) enforcement was of  doubtful effectiveness. However, the 
government encouraged the use of  capital by  subsidizing credit, provid- 
ing customs duty exemptions,  and tax holidays,  and  offering other in- 
centives to new investment. 
The behavior of  real wages over the past twenty-five years suggests 
that  wage determination occurs in an undistorted labor market. Every 
indication is that real wages fell by at least half  from the early 1950s to 
the mid-l960s, then rebounded just as dramatically by 1971.6 Table 5.7 
provides time-series data on wage rates in different types of  employment. 
In column 1, note that the real annual wage in 1973 rupiahs in all large- 
scale manufacturing fell from the initial level of  Rp 110,300 in 1954 to 
Rp 46,000 in 1962. This represents nearly a 60 percent fall in real wages 
over eight years. Real wages remained near this level until 1967, and by 
1973 had returned to 77 percent of their 1954  level^.^ 194  MarkM.Pitt 
Table 5.7  Real Wages in Indonesia, 1951-73 
Average Yearly  Average Yearly 
Wage in  Wage in 
Large-Scale  Medium-Scale  Average Monthly 
Manufacturing  Manufacturing  Wage on Estates 
(1973 Rupiahs)  (1973 Rupiahs)  (1966 Rupiahs) 
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Source:  Cols.  1 and 2: Biro Pusat Statistik, Statistical Pock- 
etbook of  Indonesia  (various  issues, 1956-63) ;  Pendaparun 
nasional Indonesia (various issues) ;  Statistik industri  (issues 
of  1971-73);  and unpublished data from Biro Pusat Statistik. 
Col.  3:  Papanek  (1974), pp.  16-17. 
Real wage  data for some nonmanufacturing  sectors demonstrate  a 
pattern similar to that of  manufacturing. Data on the average monthly 
wage  (including payments  in kind)  paid  on estates  in  constant  1966 
rupiahs  indicate a trend similar to that of  the other  time series.s Real 
wages in large-scale manufacturing and on estates fell by almost equal 
percentages  (54 percent)  between  1954 and  1963, then by  1973 they 
both regained a real wage of  about 75 percent of  that of  1954. 
Two other characteristics of  the movement  of  real  wages are worth 
noting. First, real wages in medium-scale manufacturing seem to have 
increased faster from the mid-1960s until 1973 than large-scale manu- 
facturing wages, closing some of  the wide gap between  them. Second, 
during the period when real wages were falling, skilled workers (defined 
here as employees  paid  by  the month)  suffered a greater  loss in real 195  Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment in Indonesia 
wages than unskilled workers (employees paid by the day or week). The 
1961 annual real wage of  unskilled workers in 1973  rupiahs was 41 per- 
cent lower than its 1954 level of  Rp 79,500, while the skilled wage fell 
5 1 percent from its 1954  level of  Rp 295,700. 
That real wages fell during a period of  two- and three-digit inflation 
and falling per capita income is not unexpected.  That they fell by  the 
magnitude indicated by the data of  table 5.7 is surprising.  Apparently 
the fall and subsequent rebound of  the real manufacturing wage was due 
to the absence of  government policies that might distort wages. 
5.1.5  Summary 
Indonesia’s  economic performance  has been  relatively impressive in 
the last decade. After a disastrous period in which GDP and manufac- 
turing output fell,  both  have  increased  substantially since  1968. One 
factor affecting this performance has been  a gradual  easing of  foreign 
exchange and trade restrictions.  However, Indonesia’s trade regime still 
must be characterized as having an overall import substitution bias. 
5.2  The Foreign Trade Regime and Effective Exchange Rates 
5.2.1  Trade Liberalization:  1966-71 
The six-year process  of  trade liberalization began  in February  1966 
with the introduction of yet another import entitlement certificate known 
as Bonus Ekspor (export bonus), which had the same acronym, BE, as 
the Bukti Ekspor of  1957-58,  mentioned in section 5.1. Exporters were 
granted  certain  percentages of  their surrendered  export receipts  in the 
form of  BE certificates. The remainder of  their surrendered  export re- 
ceipts were exchanged at the official rate of  Rp 10 =  $1. Initially, the 
BE certificate represented a nonsalable right to foreign exchange for the 
import of  certain goods on the “BE list.”  The share of  export receipts 
that were  exchanged  for BE certificates  was  increased  twice  in  1966 
alone,  and with the last increase BEs were  made freely salable.  After 
July  1967, all  surrendered  export  receipts  were  exchanged  for BE 
certificates. 
Other elements of  the foreign trade regime during this period included 
legal underinvoicing  (the check-price overprice system), exchange con- 
trols, and a unification of  the exchange system. Each is discussed below. 
The Check-Price Overprice System: 
A system called check-price overprice (identical to legal underinvoic- 
ing) played an important role by subsidizing exports in the 1960s. Over- 
price  is  the  foreign  exchange  retained  when  actual  export  receipts 
exceed a stated surrender price or check-price. Although this foreign ex- 196  MarkM.Pitt 
change retention had been tacitly recognized earlier, it was given legiti- 
mate status by the Foreign Exchange Law of  1964 and became known as 
Devisa  Pelangkap  (Complementary  Foreign  Exchange),  or  DP ex- 
change  . 
Regulations enacted in  1965 permitted DP exchange earned as over- 
price to be used for importing or to be sold once. Sale of  DP exchange 
could be legally accomplished  only through foreign exchange banks  at 
agreed prices. Imports using DP exchange did not require a license, but 
they bore additional import duties. Because of  these restrictions  on its 
sale and use, only a small part of  the overprice  (DP) was surrendered 
by most  exporters.  Unreported  overprice was kept  as  cash  abroad or 
used  as  free  foreign  exchange  (Siahaan  1969, p.  26).  In  1967 re- 
strictions on the use  and  sale of  DP exchange were  greatly  loosened, 
and a market for DP exchange was established in Jakarta. 
In table 5.8, the overprice for natural rubber sheets (RSS I) has been 
calculated quarterly for the period 1965 I through 1970 I. The overprice 
margin  (or the degree of  legal underinvoicing) ,  defined as the share of 
overprice in total realized price, varied widely over the period. After a 
severe reduction in mid-1967,  the overprice was restored in  1968 and 
remained  at a comparatively high level until the check-price  overprice 
system was terminated in April 1970. After April 1970, illegal underin- 
voicing of  exports may still have continued, although there was only a 
small incentive to do so. 
The importance of  overprice in exporter receipts is demonstrated by 
the  large  share  of  overprice  earnings  in  the  effective  exchange  rate 
(EER). At the time the check-price  overprice system was terminated, 
overprice accounted for nearly half of  the rupiah earnings per dollar of 
rubber export. For example, the Bank Indonesia officially estimated that, 
in the 1969-70  fiscal year, the overprice margin of  nonoil exports was 
26.4 percent. Thus, these overprice margins varied over time and over 
commodities that depended  to a large degree  upon  the administrative 
ability of  the Ministry of  Trade to reset check-prices in line with world 
price movements. The use of  this overprice system also meant that ex- 
port data at the commodity level were undervalued for the years when 
the system operated  (1965-70),  since exports were recorded  at their 
check-prices rather than their realized prices. 
Regulation of Imports 
as follows: 
books, pharmaceuticals. 
and capital goods that are foreign exchange earning or saving. 
In 1966,  imports were classified into five categories, officially described 
Category I :  Essential commodities; for example, rice, fertilizers, text- 
Category 11: Raw materials and auxiliary goods, semifinished products 197  Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment in Indonesia 
Category I11 : Raw materials, auxiliary goods, and semifinished prod- 
Category IV: Other goods (mostly finished consumer goods). 
Category V: Prohibited goods. 
ucts intended for domestic consumption. 
Table 5.8  Check-Price Overprice System for Rubber, 1965-70 
Average  Overprice 
Average  New York  Overpricea  Earnings as 
Check-Price  Spot Price  (Legal Under-  Overprice  Percentage 
of  Rubber  of  Rubber  invoicing)  Marginb  of  EER 
(CentdLb.)  (Cents/Lb.)  (Cents/Lb.)  (Percent)  for Rubber 
































































































































37.2  44.7  13.88  24.30  8.22 
Sources:  Check  prices:  Warta Perdagangan  and  Business  News (Jakarta) ; New 
York  spot prices:  Commodity  Yearbook; effective  exchange  rates:  Pitt  (1977), 
Note:  Calculations are for rubber  smoked  sheet I  (RSS I). 
Calculated as  (col.  2 -  2.2) -  col.  1; deduction  of  2.2  cents/lb.  corrects  New 
York spot price to f.0.b.  net. 
bcalculated as col.  3/(col. 2 -  2.2). 
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The differing types of  exchange were restricted to the import of  com- 
modities from certain import categories as outlined below: 
Eligible 
Types of Exchange  Import Categories 
BE certificates  Commodities  from  the  “BE  list” 
(composed  of  a  restricted  set  of 
commodities) 
Provincial foreign exchange 
DP (Complementary Exchange) 
Foreign exchange from the 
Foreign Exchange Fund 
I, 11, and I11 
I, 11,111, and IV 
Subject to license 
allocations 
Aid-BEs  Aid-BE lists, usually more restric- 
tive than the ordinary BE list 
Aid-BEs  were  foreign  credits  and  grants  sold  by  the  government  to 
importers in the form of  BE certificates. The Aid-BEs  were sold at a 
substantial discount from  export  BEs because their use was restricted 
to imports from the donor country, lists of  commodities eligible for im- 
port were usually more restrictive, and delivery lags were longer. 
In 1967 the BE list was revised, and imports paid with provincial for- 
eign  exchange were  restricted  to the commodities  on the BE list.  In 
addition,  a DP  list was formulated  that  included  all items  importable 
with DP exchange that were not on the BE list. Special Aid-BE lists re- 
mained for each donor country. The relative importance of  these types 
of  import financing is evident in table 5.9. Note the large share of  im- 
ports financed by  foreign aid, almost 30 percent in 1967 and 1968. 
Imports were also subject to special licensing, varying degrees of  pre- 
payment, import duties, surtaxes, luxury taxes, and “excess profits” tax. 
Exchange Rate Unification 
In May 1968 the special Aid-BE rate was abolished. However, since 
Aid-BE  credits were  tied  to  donor  countries,  and since lists of  goods 
that could be imported with Aid-BE exchange were more restrictive than 
ordinary BE exchange, special credit inducements were provided to en- 
courage their use. 
In April  1970 the dual  exchange  rate  system was  ended  and  the 
check-price  overprice system was ab~lished.~  The markets for BEs and 
DP exchange were merged, and the exchange rate was set at Rp 378 = 
$1. This was  the DP exchange rate before  exchange  rate unification. 199  Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment in Indonesia 
Table 5.9  Total Import Financing, 1966-71/72 (in Millions of U.S. 
Dollars) 












Imports of  oil companies 
Subtotal 
Total 
68  114 
1 
0  0 
536  737 
68  68 


























Source : Bank Indonesia Report, various years. 
aFiscal year. 
While this rate was nominally  floating, the Bank Indonesia intervened 
in the market to support it. 
The exchange  rate  unification  meant  that  the more  essential  com- 
modities on the BE list no longer  enjoyed  a more favorable exchange 
rate than other imports that could previously be financed only with DP 
exchange. When  credit costs  are taken  into  account, imports with BE 
exchange may have actually been more expensive than imports with DP 
exchange.  Importing with BE exchange  was  relatively  more  expensive 
because cheap foreign credit was available only to DP exchange financed 
imports. At one time, commodities on the BE list made up more than 
half  of  the  value  of  imports  financed  with  DP  exchange  (Simpkin 
1970, p. 6). 
The devaluation of  23 August 1971 to Rp 415 per dollar was Indo- 
nesia’s last  official  devaluation.  It marked  the end of  a  liberalization 
phase  that had  transformed  Indonesia’s  trade  regime from one of  the 
more restrictive  among LDCs to one in which there was full exchange 
convertibility and a complete absence of  foreign exchange licensing. 
5.2.2  Effective Exchange Rates 
To determine the effects of  this complicated succession of  foreign ex- 
change policies on returns  from exporting, the effective exchange rate 
(EER,)for  rubber  exports  has  been  calculated.  Although  there were 
periods when literally dozens of  EERs for various exports existed, for 
the purpose of  this research the rubber  exchange rate is  an adequate 200  MarkM.Pitt 
proxy for an average EER, weighted by the value of  exports. One reason 
this is true is that rubber would carry an enormous weight in such an 
average calculation. From 1950 to 1969, rubber exports contributed on 
the  average about  57 percent  of  all nonmineral exports. In addition, 
rubber’s EER over that period usually lay somewhere near the middle 
of  a ranking of  the EERs of  major agricultural exports. Pepper, tea, and 
kapok had  somewhat higher EER,s,  while copra and coffee often had 
lower  EER,s.  Other  less  important  exports  often  had  the  highest 
EER,s, but they would carry very little weight in a weighted average. 
The EER,s  presented in table 5.10 were calculated by  summing the 
values of  all trade policy instruments, including such things as the value 
of  import entitlement certificates, foreign exchange retention, and export 
taxes  and  premiums.  The EER, thus  calculated may  differ, however, 
from the rate actually realized, because of  illegal transactions. 
The importance of  the export incentive schemes meant that changes 
in  the official registered exchange rates  did  not  significantly alter the 
EER,. For example, the gross devaluation of  200 percent in 1952 (from 
Rp 3.8 to Rp 11.40) resulted in a net devaluation of  12.5 percent. Like- 
wise, gross devaluations of  294 percent, 22,000 percent, 16 percent, and 
10 percent in 1959, 1965, 1970, and 1971 resulted in net devaluations 
of  19 percent, 300 percent, 8 percent, and 10 percent respectively. 
Table 5.10 also presents an index of  the estimated annual  average 
price level  deflated effective  exchange  rate  (PLD-EER,)  for  natural 
rubber.1° The tremendous variance in the PLD-EER, index shows the 
effects of  a consistently rapid rise in domestic prices countered from time 
to time by devaluation. 
Notes to Table 5.10 
Source:  Pitt  1977, pp.  56, 66. 
Note: Col.  1: Effective exchange rate for  (rubber)  exports expressed  in  old  rii- 
piahs through 1965 and thereafter  in new rupiahs resulting  from the thousand-to- 
one currency  conversion  of  December  1965. 
Col. 2:  Cost-of-living  index for a  government worker  in Jakarta linked  with  the 
sixty-two-item Jakarta cost-of-living index (expressed in old rupiah equivalent after 
1965). 
Col. 3: Col.  1 deflated by col. 2 (and, from 1966 on, multiplied by  1,000 to adjust 
for currency  conversion  in  December  1965)  and converted  to  index  series  with 
1971 as base year. 
Col. 4:  See text  (and, for currency conversion, see note on col.  1). 
Col. 5:  Percentage excess of domestic price  over world  price  (less  transportation 
costs), latter being  converted  at  rates  given  in  col.  1.  As  explained  in text,  the 
term “disparity”  is no longer appropriate  for differentials after 1965. 
Col. 6: Realized  effective exchange rate for exports; i.e.,  col.  1 increased  by  per- 
centage in col. 5. 
Col. 7: Col. 6 adjusted in same way as col. 1 in col. 3. 
Col. 8:  Effective exchange rate for imports adjusted like col.  1 in col. 3. 
For further explanatiori of  concepts, see text and chapter 1. Table 5.10  Exchange Rates, Variously Defined and Adjusted,  Annual Averages, 1950-72 
cost of  Free  Price 
Living  Index of  Exchange  Disparity  Index of  Index of 
Index  PLD-EER,  Rate  for Rubber  REER,  PLD-REER,  PLD-EER,  EER, 
(Rpper$)  (1953 = 100)  (1971 = 100)  (Rpper$)  (%)  (Rp per $)  (1971 = 100)  (1971 = 100) 
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In addition  to the PLD-EER,,  the ratio  of  the EER to the black- 
market  or free-market  rate of  exchange gives  some  indication,  albeit 
uncertain,  of  the rupiah’s  overvaluation.ll  Illegal transactions in inter- 
national trade characterized the 1950s and 1960~~  with substantial quan- 
tities of  foreign exchange being traded through black markets. In many 
years the black-market  rate of  exchange was many  times  greater than 
the effective rate. At its peak in early  1960, the black-market rate was 
almost eleven times the EER,, and over the five years 1960-64  it aver- 
aged more than five times as great. Since the black-market  rate repre- 
sents the exchange rate for foreign exchange earned in smuggling, these 
disparities indicate that there were enormous incentives to smuggle. 
It is well known  that the smuggling of  agricultural exports-rubber 
and  copra  in  particular-was  widespread.  Because  smuggling was  a 
significant share of export trade, the EER, calculations for rubber that 
have  been  presented  may  not  be good  measures of  the returns  from 
export  trade;  logically  it  might  be  expected  that  smuggled  rubber 
earned a greater rupiah return per dollar of  export than legally exported 
rubber.  And,  indeed,  one  phenomenon  that  characterized  Indonesian 
trade in the presence of  smuggling was the existence of  price disparity 
that is defined as the positive difference between the domestic price and 
the world  price  of  an exported  commodity  converted  at the legal  ef- 
fective  exchange  rate.  The existence  of  price  disparity  indicates  that 
some  of  the  higher  returns  from  smuggling vis-8-vis  legal  trade  are 
passed back to producers in the form of  higher domestic prices.12 
In table 5.10 annual estimates of  price disparity caused by smuggling 
of  rubber are presented, with price disparity being measured  as a per- 
centage: 
Pa -  (EER,  Pw) 
EER,  P  x 100, 
where  Pd =  domestic price of  rubber in rupiahs at Jakarta 
Pw =  international  trade price of  rubber; here it is based on 
the f.0.b.  price of  rubber  at Singapore less transporta- 
tion costs. 
EER, =  legal effective exchange rate for rubber 
The effect of  smuggling on the domestic price of  rubber over much 
of the  1950s and  1960s is  demonstrated  by  these  calculations. Over 
1959-65,  smuggling increased  the domestic price  of  rubber  by  more 
than 46 percent on the average beyond the price that would have existed 
in its absence. In the year  1960 the domestic price was  about double 
the legal trade price. Kenneth Thomas (1966, p. 102) claims that price 
disparity exceeded 160 percent in September 1965. After the reforms of 
1966, price  disparity fell markedly, as can be seen from  column 5 of 203  Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment in Indonesia 
table 5.10. Indeed, in some years the domestic price was slightly below 
the world price. 
It is clear  that over a number  of  years smuggling, working through 
the mechanism of  price disparity, counterbalanced a significant amount 
of the price distorting effects of  government trade policy. The effective 
exchange rate for  all  exports that was actually  realized,  REER,,  was 
(EER,) X  (1 +  price disparity). The REER, for rubber is presented 
in table 5.10. The REER,s  imply a level of  price distortion considerably 
less than is implied by the EER,s. In addition, in table 5.10 there is also 
an index of  PLD-REER,. These calculations suggest that, during 1958- 
65, generally regarded as the period of  greatest government intervention 
in the trade sector, the realized rupiah return to a dollar’s worth of  rub- 
ber  export  was,  surprisingly,  on the  average  slightly  greater,  in real 
terms, than it was at the end of  the liberalization period in 1971. 
The PLD-EER  for imports  presented  as  an  index  in  table  5.10 is 
calculated by comparing domestic and international import price indexes 
and deflating by the increase in domestic prices.  Keeping in mind  the 
potential error in such a calculation owing to aggregation and smuggling, 
note that the calculated PLD-EER, was at its highest level in 1959-65, 
when the value of  total imports was lowest and subject to the greater 
restrictions.  It was low in 1951-53,  reflecting the freeing of  imports as 
a result of  the Korean War commodity price boom, but it leaped in 1955 
when  foreign  exchange  allotments  for  consumer  goods  were  sharply 
curtailed.  As  the  trade  regime  was  liberalized,  the  PLD-EER,  fell 
sharply, dropping nearly  two-thirds  from 1965 to  1972. Thus the esti- 
mated PLD-EER,  seems to have moved in accordance with the nature 
of  the trade regime. 
5.2.3 
As I mentioned earlier, there  has been  a definite movement toward 
increased protection  of  import-competing industries since  1972. How- 
ever Indonesia’s trade policies remain generally more liberal than those 
in  other  large  LDCs.  Examination  of  tariff  schedules  imposed  since 
1971 cannot provide information on whether protection from tariffs has 
increased  without information  on tariff  collection  rates, which tend  to 
differ markedly  from scheduled rates. Although  a  sectoral breakdown 
of  tariff  collections  is unavailable  for the years  since  1971, it has re- 
cently been reported that there have been substantial increases in import 
duty collections  (Grenville 1977, p. 25). In addition, the use of  check- 
prices on imported  commodities on which  customs  duties and  import 
sales taxes  are calculated has recently  emerged  as  a protective device. 
For example, the check-prices on some textiles were raised by  as much 
as 75 percent in 1975 alone. Imports of  textiles and other commodities 
have also faced increased quantitative restrictions,  import duty prepay- 
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ment,  and restricted  access to credit. On the other hand, exports have 
benefited from the reduction of  the 10 percent export tax. 
The government has also had a growing influence on factor markets. 
Minimum wage regulations have been enacted for a limited set of  indus- 
tries in certain  regions,  and more  are promised.  The government  has 
further  encouraged  the use  of  capital-intensive  technologies  by  subsi- 
dizing  credit  and  providing  customs  duty  exemptions,  tax  holidays, 
and other incentives to new investment. On the other hand, it has acted 
to protect  small-scale  firms by  exempting from sales  and excise taxes 
weaving, knitting, and cigarette products originating from factories using 
nonmechanized  technologies.  Nevertheless,  most  observers  agree  that 
the recent  new  investment  in  manufacturing  is  very  capital-intensive 
relative to existing ~1ants.l~  This is particularly true for the increasingly 
large public sector (including PERTAMINA) investments. After exam- 
ining public sector investments, McCawley and Manning  (1976, p. 27) 
conclude that “it would be difficult to prepare a more capital intensive 
set of  projects.  Thus, despite the official emphasis  that is given to the 
need to create jobs, in practice the goal of  employment creation has re- 
ceived low priority.”  In brief, current trade strategy seems to be moving 
away frum a liberslized  foreign scctor and the express goal of  employ- 
ment creation. 
5.3  Effective Protection in Indonesian Manufacturing 
5.3.1  Procedures 
The 1971 input-output table for Indonesia provides much of  the basic 
data necessary for the ERP estimates.14 The table includes  32 agricul- 
ture, livestock, forestry, and fishing activities, and 12 mining, 82 manu- 
facturing, and 45 service or other activities. Four of  the  171 activities 
had no domestic production  in  1971, so there were  167 producing in- 
dustries. For this study 2 activities were disaggregated to bring the total 
number of  producing activities to 169, of  which 83 were in manufactur- 
ing. The bulk of  cottage and small-scale agricultural processing such as 
hand pounding of  rice and peasant sugar refining were treated as manu- 
facturing value-added  activities and included with similar processes oc- 
curring in larger-scale production units. 
To estimate nominal protection, I relied heavily upon vectors of  cus- 
toms duty and import sales tax collections and the c.i.f. value of  imports 
included in the input-output  table. These provide appropriate measures 
as long as tariffs are the only trade restriction  and domestic taxes are 
not a factor. However, price comparisons were used to measure nominal 
protection  in  activities  where  imports  were  prohibited.16 In addition, 
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have  also  had  their  nominal  protection  estimated  in  this  manner.  In 
197  1 these government-imported commodities were rice, cloves,16 wheat 
flour,  fertilizer,  pesticides  and  inputs  into  pesticide  production,  and 
sugar. 
Besides tariffs, I had to consider a variety of  other protective devices 
in making my ERP calculations. These included an import sales tax, a 
withholding  tax on corporate income,  special  exchange  rates,  export 
taxes, and, finally, the existence of  illegal transactions. Each is discussed 
below. 
Imported commodities are exempt from the domestic sales tax, and 
thus the import sales tax is not entirely protective. Collected at the same 
time  as the customs duty  and using the same tariff  nomenclature,  the 
import sales tax differs from the customs duty by both its rate of  levy 
(and collection) and its base, which is the c.i.f. price of  the import plus 
the customs duty and a 5 percent markup to cover presumptive storage, 
transport, and other costs. The domestic sales tax is not harmonized with 
the import sales tax. Only rarely does the domestic sales tax completely 
offset its import counterpart. The computation of  the extent of  the offset 
is complicated by a change in the tax schedule that went into effect in 
July and August of  197  1. 
Another complication in computing ERPs arises because of  the MPO 
tax, a withholding tax on corporation income.17 It is paid to the govern- 
ment, at an ad valorem rate by the MPO collector on behalf of  the pur- 
chaser, who can credit this amount against his corporation income tax 
liability. On domestic sales, the MPO rate was 2 percent in 1971, with 
the  seller  usually  acting  as  MPO collector.  For imported  goods,  the 
MPO rate was 3 percent except for commodities imported with a mer- 
chant’s letter of  credit  (L/C), for which  the rate was  6 percent.  The 
tax was not collected  on exports.  In the  1971-72  fiscal year,  imports 
with a merchant’s L/C  were 20 percent  of  all imports and 37 percent 
of  all imports excluding those financed by foreign aid and direct invest- 
ment.  For imports,  banks  usually  act  as  collector,  probably  making 
evasion  more  difficult than for domestic  sales.  About one-half  of  all 
MPO revenue is collected from imports. 
While the MPO increases the price of  a commodity to a firm by its 
rate of  collection, it may not affect a firm’s decision-making if  the levy 
is merely treated as an advance payment on its profits tax. In that case 
the only  protective  effect of  the discriminatory  MPO rate on imports 
would be the relatively minor cost of  additional tax prepayment. 
However, because of  the presumptive nature of  the base of  the corpo- 
ration income tax, the firm may choose not to claim an MPO tax credit.18 
For tax collection purposes,  profits  are presumptively  determined  as a 
margin on sales, which in turn are a presumptive markup on cost. The 
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cost  and thus, up the chain  of  margins, the firm’s presumed  profit. It 
may be to a firm’s advantage to underreport MPO tax credits and thus 
reduce presumptive profit. Therefore the MPO tax is considered a sales 
tax and, for sectors subject to MPO tax, nominal protection in the esti- 
mates presented here includes a 1 percent MPO protective effect. This is 
a low estimate because the 4 percent protective effect of MPO on imports 
with merchants’ L/C  has been ignored.  This is somewhat offset by ex- 
emptions on MPO  payment  given  firms under  tax holiday  and  other 
special cases. 
Special exchange rates took two forms in 1971  : fixed subsidized rates 
of  exchange to import weaving yarns under  the PL-480 program  and 
raw cotton; and special  rates of  exchange for the import  of  restricted 
lists  of  commodities  from  certain  origins  with  aid  foreign  exchange 
(Devisu Kredit). On average during 1971  , these special exchange rates 
represented  a subsidy of  46.7 percent for raw cotton and 68.0 percent 
for PL-480 weaving yarns.19 These are taken into account in the ERP 
estimates below. 
Incentives for the use of  aid foreign exchange beginning January 1971 
included a reduced  prefinancing requirement for aid exchange imports 
from most  origins and an interest  rate discount for credit.  Concurrent 
with the official devaluation of  23 August  1971, a system of  rebates to 
the official exchange rate of  Rp 415 varying by  country of  origin was 
instituted for the import of  goods with aid foreign exchange.20  Although 
nearly 24 percent of  all imports in 1971 were paid for with aid foreign 
exchange (excluding imports under food and project aid) ,  it was ignored 
in calculating ERPs for two reasons. First, it was not possible to deter- 
mine the rate of  subsidization by  sector, and, second, the aid exchange 
rebates probably only offset the additional cost of  their use. 
In 1971 exporters were required to surrender 10 percent of  their ex- 
port proceeds as an export tax. Exempted were the export of  “finished 
goods and handicrafts”  as defined by commodity lists. The lists do not 
seem entirely consistent; for example, tea was considered a finished good, 
while  coffee, rubber,  vegetable  oils,  and  almost  all  other  NRB  and 
processed NRB goods were not. In addition, rubber, coffee, copra, and 
pepper  exports were subject to a cess and rehabilitation levy on a per 
kilogram  basis.  These  levies were  substantially reduced  in  mid-1971. 
In addition, copra was also subject to regional levies, and coffee needed 
International Coffee Agreement stamps in order to be exported to Inter- 
national  Coffee Organization  (ICO) member  nations.  Finally,  certain 
exports were prohibited with protective intent, namely, lower grades of 
rubber  and chinchona bark, the raw material of  quinine. All the above 
have been incorporated into the protection estimates. 
Under Indonesia’s Sales Tax Act, export shipments are exempt from 
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exempt from sales tax commodities that by nature are destined for ex- 
port, although they may be utilized locally in intermediate stages. Never- 
theless, according to Cnossen (  1973, p. 3 1 ) these provisions are not ob- 
served in practice.  Therefore,  in the ERP computations it is  assumed 
that domestic sales taxes are levied on exports. 
Illegal  transactions,  traditionally  an important  facet  of  Indonesian 
foreign  trade, are potentially  the most  troublesome  source of  error in 
calculating protection  rates. Two aspects of  illegal import transactions 
may be important: importers may pay less than the listed tariff  rate on 
the true value of  the import, or they may pay the listed tariff on an un- 
derinvoiced import value. 
Richard  Cooper  (  1974) has verified  the  quantitative importance of 
the first aspect  (paying less than the stated tariff  rate) through a com- 
parison of  actual tariff collections and the listed legal tariffs. Not all of 
the difference between  theoretical  and  actual tariff  collections  can be 
attributed  to  illegal  transactions.  There  are a  number  of  legal  tariff 
exemptions, including imports for direct investment by both foreign and 
domestic firms, imports for aid projects, and numerous special exemp- 
tions by  the Ministries  of Finance  and Trade.21 Nevertheless,  exempt 
imports explain only  a small part of  the difference between theoretical 
and actual tariff collections. 
Even  if  importers  pay the listed tariff, there may still be evasion of 
tariffs if  the commodity is underinvoiced. Recall that  actual tariff  col- 
lections are the starting point for most of  the nominal protection calcu- 
lations.  Thus  underinvoicing  can  create  a  real  problem  because tariff 
collections  are  divided  by  the listed  (underinvoiced)  c.i.f.  values  of 
imports to obtain tariff  rates and therefore protection is overestimated. 
However, the computed estimates will be reliable if  all imports are cor- 
rectly  valued  at customs  and  if  illegal transactions  occur  only via  the 
underpayment  of  trade taxes.  That is, the actual tariff  collections,  al- 
though underpaid  (less than implied by the listed tariff) would measure 
protection on the actual c.i.f.  price. 
Using data on foreign and domestic prices for a number of  imported 
commodities for the years 1969 and 1971, Cooper econometrically esti- 
mated the relationship between observed domestic prices and scheduled 
tariff rates. Employing his results and the observed relationship between 
actual tariff collections and scheduled tariff rates, I performed an analy- 
sis to determine if  the use of  tariff collection data and declared import 
values results in a systematic underestimate  (or overestimate) of  actual 
domestic prices. There was no evidence that nominal rates of  protection 
calculated  with  tariff  collections  data would  be systematically  biased, 
only that the error of  the estimates may be large.22 
Finally, adjustments had to be made in activities where intermediate 
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differing nominal rates  of  protection.  This was particularly important 
in  assembly  industries, where  commodities in  a  completely  knocked 
down (CKD) condition enter with a tariff discount. 
5.3.2  The Structure of  Protection 
Estimates of nominal and effective protection for Indonesian manu- 
facturing activities for the year 1971 are given in the Appendix (along 
with their input-output code numbers and names). Aggregates for trad- 
able categories are presented  in  table  5.11,  and values for major ex- 
portables and importables are given in table 5.12. 
Classification of Activities 
Forty-six activities were classified as home goods. Most of  these were 
service activities, but also included are sugarcane (1-0 code no. 1  1  ) ,  cof- 
fee (16), tea  (17), dairy products  (23), poultry products  (26), stone 
quarrying (40),  and repairing of  motor vehicles (118). A few service 
activities in which trade was substantial were not considered home goods. 
Paddy (  1  ) and cassava (3  ) ,  which enter trade in small amounts, might 
marginally  be  considered home  goods but  were  classified  as natural 
resource based  (NRB) tradables in the following analysis.23 
All agriculture, forestry, livestock, fishing, mining, and quarrying activ- 
ities not considered home goods were classified as NRB tradables,  as 
was nonferrous metal refining (  103). 
Table 5.11  Distribution of  Effective Protection in Indonesian 
Manufacturing, 1971 




2.  Importables (excluding negative IVA activities) 
Activities with lowest protection 
Excluding processed NRBs 
Activities with medium protection 
Excluding processed NRBs 
Activities with highest protection 
Excluding processed NRBs 
3.  All importables (including negative IVA activities) 
4. Noncompeting importables 
5. All importable sectors (3 and 4) 













Source:  Appendix table 5.A.1. 
Note:  Calculated  as  x 100, where  i  indexes  the  activities  in  a 
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Table 5.12  Characteristics of Major HOS Exportables and Importables, 1971 
Industry 
~  ~ 
with 
Nominal  Effective  DCs 
Protection  Protection  T,  Tradea 
Exporta  bies 
Canned and preserved fish 
Coconut oil and cooking oil 
and seafoods  0% 
-  10 
Vegetable oils, animal oils. and fats -  10 




Tanneries and leather finishing 
Sawmills 
Smoking and remilling of rubber 
Importables 
Canned and preserved meat 










-  10 
-15 
0 

















-  12 
-  19 
-  19 
0 















-  .oo 
-  .06 
-  .83 
-  .22 
-  .60 
-  .66 
-  .13 
-  1.08 
-  .oo 











.oo  80 
.05  69 
.08  15 
.03  62 
.OO  96 
.40  49 
.19  75 
.02  79 
.30  97 
.03  78 
S2  99 
Source:  Appendix table 5.A.1, 5.A.2. 
Note:  Activities with production in excess of  25,000 million rupiahs. 
nTrade refers to exports for exportables and imports for importables. 
bowing to a fall in inventories, export exceeded production, and therefore  the cal- 
culated value for T is  positive.  A sector  is  exportable  if  Tc < 0  or T > l; the 
latter values can occur only if  inventories are reduced. 
All activities classified as NOS tradables were manufacturing  activi- 
ties. These industries were further classified as either exportable, import- 
able, or noncompeting, following the T statistic methodology described 
in  chapter  1. Exportables had  a negative  Ti, importables  had  Tis be- 
tween 0 and 0.8, and noncompeting had Tis greater than 0.8. 
These values are calculated only for the year 1971. For those activi- 
ties whose value of T was close to 0 or 0.8 or where there was a priori 
knowledge  of  significant trade fluctuations, reference  was made to the 
trade  data of  succeeding  and preceding years  in  making  the ultimate 
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aircraft  (119)  industries  were  classified  differently  than  the  1971 T 
statistic would indicate.24 
HOS  tradables  were  further  subdivided  into  those  considered  to 
process NRB goods and those  that do not. The processed  NRB sub- 
group  as used  here  covers  certain  manufacturing  activities  that, with 
the  input-output  information  available  at  the  time  of  preparing  this 
analysis, could not be clearly separated between the NRB stages neces- 
sary to turn  a raw  material into a tradable product  and further HOS 
stages of processing.  Coffee provides a good illustration on the side of 
Indonesia’s exports. Although the coffee growing activity (1-0 code num- 
ber  16) is properly categorized as NRB, the value added in the coffee 
roasting  and  grinding  activity  (58) embraces  certain  additional  NRB 
states such as the sorting and drying needed to make the product trad- 
able and further HOS processing beyond  that point.  A similar mixture 
of  NRB and HOS stages is found in tapioca  (53)  and tea processing 
(59) among export industries and in rice milling (51) and sugar refin- 
ing (56)  among importable industries. These industries are accordingly 
classified as processed  NRBs  in the following analysis. Given  the im- 
portance of  the smoking and remilling of  rubber  (1-0 code 94) as an 
export industry, it should be noted that this industry is not here classi- 
fied as a processed NRB but rather as “other HOS.” The reason is that 
natural rubber can be exported in cruder form, processed just sufficiently 
to allow it to be traded, and as such would be considered an export from 
the rubber-tapping activity (  10)  .25 
In  analyzing  the structure  of  protection  and  factor  proportions  in 
various classes of  HOS tradables, two activities were excluded  (“petro- 
leum refining” [91] and “other petroleum  and coal products”  [92])  be- 
cause of  a lack of data on factor requirements  (except for the wages 
and salaries data of  the input-output table). With their huge value added 
(almost 15 percent of  total value added in HOS industries),  any error 
in estimating their factor requirements would lead to a correspondingly 
large error in the aggregate results.26 
The Distribution of ERPs over Commodity Categories 
The distribution of  average ERPs by commodity category is presented 
in table 5.1  1. Importable activities excluding those with negative inter- 
national value added were ranked by ERPs. This ranking was then di- 
vided into three groups of  equal domestic value added, and the groups 
were labeled as “lowest protection,” “medium protection,” and “highest 
protection”  sectors. 
Eight activities had negative value added at international prices, all of 
them HOS importables. Four of  them were textile industries, including 
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LDCs  have efficient textile  industries,  often with large export  volume. 
For the Indonesian weaving industry, nominal protection was not extra- 
ordinarily high  (44.3  percent); it was largely the subsidy given cotton 
yarn  imports  that  resulted  in  the finding of  negative IVA. Of  course 
there may be some components of  this sector with positive IVA. 
Negative ERPs were found to occur in fifteen of  the manufacturing 
activities reported in table 5.A.1. Of  these fifteen activities, eleven were 
HOS exportables, three were noncompeting importables, and one was a 
processed  NRB HOS  importable  (rice milling).  The large number of 
HOS exportables with negative protection indicates the lack of  attention 
to exports, and the consequent disincentives for them, that characterized 
the Indonesian trade strategy in 1971. 
Since eleven out of  fifteen exportable industries had negative rates of 
protection, it is not surprising that, as a group, exportables had negative 
effective protection  of  -1  1 percent.  The trade regime quite definitely 
favored importables, with their overall rate of  protection of  66 percent. 
Indonesia, like many other countries in this study, did not provide high 
levels of  protection  to  noncompeting importables,  particularly  if  they 
produced capital goods. These industries had a relatively low 15 percent 
ERP. 
The least-protected  activities in the importable  group had  negative 
effective protection.  This is due mainly  to  the negative protection  af- 
forded  the  large  rice  milling sector. When  rice  milling  and the other 
processed NRB importables  (sugar refining)  were excluded, protection 
was  positive.  The protection  afforded the most-protected  industries in 
the importable  group was six times that  afforded  all nonnegative  IVA 
importable industries. These results indicate the wide range of  incentives 
given to the various manufacturing sectors. 
5.4  Factor Proportions in Indonesian Trade in Manufactures 
5.4.1  The Measurement of  Factor Inputs 
For HOS importable and exportable activities, nine measures of  factor 
use were employed: four types of  labor, one measure of  skills, and four 
measures of  capital. 
Four surveys  were  drawn  upon  to estimate  labor  coefficients.  The 
total labor requirements per million rupiahs of  DVA in importable and 
export industries were calculated from a 1973 industrial survey carried 
out by the Biro Pusat Statistik of  Indonesia covering large and medium- 
size firms.27 These data were  augmented by a  1973 sample survey of 
small firms (Biro Pusat Statistik 1974) in a limited number of  industries 
and a new  1974-75  industrial census of  household  and cottage indus- 212  MarkM.Pitt 
tries (Biro Pusat Statistik  1976-77).  The data permitted measurement 
of  labor requirements in terms of  man-days and are believed superior to 
data derived from the input-output table. 
Labor  requirements  were  disaggregated  into manager,  other white- 
collar, male operative, and female operative man-days on the basis of  a 
1971 industrial survey (BPS, Statistik Zndustri  1971). The 1971 survey 
contained information on the number of  employees of  each of  these four 
types by  sector. The proportion of  each type of  employee in the total 
employees of  each sector was then multiplied by the total labor require- 
ments in man-days obtained from the 1973 data to yield the final man- 
days disaggregations. For this purpose it is assumed that man-days per 
employee did not differ across the various employee types and that the 
employee composition did not change from 1971 to 1973.28 
The measure of  skills used is based on estimates of  the average wage 
per man-day  calculated from the 1973 industrial survey of  large-  and 
medium-size firms. The wage for unskilled  labor was taken to be the 
average wage of  the five HOS tradable sectors reporting the lowest aver- 
age wage-Rp  125 per man-day. Pure skill-days per million rupiahs of 
value added for sector  i was then computed as the ratio of  the wage in 
the ith industry to the unskilled  labor wage times total  man-days  per 
million  rupiahs  of  domestic  value  added.  Other  measures  of  skill in- 
tensity  can be  derived  from  the labor  requirement  disaggregation,  for 
example, the ratio of  white-collar to blue-collar  man-days. 
There are four capital requirement measures, two based on the horse- 
power of  installed machinery and two on energy utilization. The horse- 
power measures are for prime movers and electric motors. Horsepower 
of  prime  movers-that  is,  machines  that  use  nonelectrical  sources of 
energy-may  represent  a  less  sophisticated type of  capital.  Such ma- 
chinery  is prevalent in food  processing  and other activities located  in 
rural  areas where electricity is unavailable. For example, prime-mover 
horsepower predominates in the large rice milling and tapioca sectors. 
The two energy-related  measures of  capital are electricity consumption 
in kilowatt-hours and the value of  all energy consumed. 
For noncompeting importables, factor requirements were taken from 
the 1973 United States Annual Survey  of  Manufactures (United States 
1976). Labor requirements in man-days are the only measure of  factor 
requirements available  from United  States data that  are comparable to 
the Indonesian data. Because domestic factor proportions differ between 
the United  States and Indonesia,  using the United States data directly 
would  underestimate  labor  requirements.  Therefore  the data  are ad- 
justed by the ratio of  the labor input in a set of  industries in Indonesia 
to the labor input in the same set of  industries in the United States. Most 
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tries  classified  as noncompeting  in  which  some  domestic  production 
nonetheless exists. 
5.4.2  Factor Proportions: Direct Requirements 
Table  5.13 presents  data on direct factor requirements per  unit of 
value  added  in HOS exportable  and importable  activities. Table 5.14 
gives estimates for major exportables and importables (a  complete listing 
is found in appendix table 5.A.2.)  For aggregating the exportable indus- 
tries,  the value-added  content  of  production  is used  as a  weight;  for 
the  import-competing  sectors,  each  sector  is  weighted  by  domestic 
value added of  domestic production plus the domestic value-added con- 
tent of  imports.29 The table also presents data with HOS processed NRB 
activities excluded. 
The data in table 5.13 indicate that exportable industries use twice 
as much labor per unit of  DVA as importables. Exportables use more of 
each type of  labor,  but  ratios vary  markedly  over labor types. White- 
collar labor is a greater share of  total labor requirements in importable 
industries than in exportable industries. Since white-collar labor typically 
embodies  more  human  capital  than  operative  labor,  the indication is 
that importables are more skill-intensive. This is borne out by the skill- 
day requirement data. 
All four measures of  capital use indicate a greater capital requirement 
by importables than by exportables. Importables use nearly two and one- 
half  times the horsepower, twice the energy expenditure, and one and 
one-half  times  the  electricity  consumption per unit  of  domestic value 
added as exportables. 
These  results  are basically  unchanged  if  processed  NRB industries 
are excluded from the analysis. As might be expected with her relative 
abundance of  unskilled labor, Indonesia’s exportables are clearly more 
labor-intensive  and less skill-intensive than her importable industries. 
5.4.3  Factor Requirements by Trade Origin and Destination 
Trade  flows  were  disaggregated  among  seven  origin/destinations: 
Japan; Singapore and Hong Kong; other developed countries; member 
countries  of  the Association  of  South-East  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN) 
except  Singapore;  South  Korea  and  Taiwan;  socialist  countries;  and 
other less developed countries. A serious problem centers on the role of 
Singapore and Hong Kong  as an entrepht for Indonesian  exports. Al- 
though  some  of  the Indonesian  exports  they  receive  are reprocessed, 
most are merely reexported, primarily to developed countries. By far the 
most important commodity to enter this trade is milled natural rubber. 
Thus,  for purposes  of  aggregating  the seven  origin/destinations  into 
two-developed  countries  and  less  developed  countries-trade  with Table 5.13  Summary Table: Direct Factor Requirements, Exportable and Import-Competing HOS Manufacturing Sectors 
(Requirements per Million Rupiahs of Value Added) 
Factor 
Import- 
Exportable  Competing  Exportable 
Import- 
Competing 
Sectors  Sectors  Sectors  Sectors 
per Unit of DVA  per Unit of DVA  per Unit of  IVA  per Unit of  IVA 
(a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
Total man-days 
Manager man-days 
Other white-collar man-days 
Male operative man-days 
Female operative man-days 
S  kill-days 
Prime mover (horsepower) 
Electric motor (horsepower) 
Total horsepower 
Electricity used (kwh) 

























































































Source: Author’s computations as described in text. 
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Table 5.14  Direct Factor Requirements in Major HOS Importables and 
Exportables Labor (Man-Days/Million  Rupiahs of DVA) 
Man-  Skill-  Total 
Industry  Total  agers  Days  Horsepower 
Importables 
Canned and preserved meat  514  21  1,069  5.93 
Rice milling and polishing  1,150  105  2,383  24.83 
Sugar refining  1,571  37  2,438  8.08 
Soybean products  3,253  88  3,695  8.59 




Printing and publishing 
Soap 
Motor vehicles 
304  5  1,398  15.01 
870  14  1,802  10.13 
1,990  63  5,508  1.75 
102  3  266  95.58 
468  16  2,134  1.85 
440  25  2,893  7.26 
Expor tables 
Canned and preserved fish and seafood  1,335  41  1,324  4.78 
Coconut oil and cooking oil  792  23  2,281  6.50 
Vegetable oil, animal fats and oils  600  17  2,400  6.50 
Dried cassava and tapioca flour  2,462  128  2,796  37.25 
Coffee grinding  3,876  196  6,822  15.61 
Tea processing  3,715  40  4,012  7.59 
Processed tobacco  4,057  46  2,953  .77 
Tanneries and leather finishing  940  38  2,218  22.32 
Sawmills  1,023  38  3,396  28.13 
Smoking and remilling of  rubber  2,300  35  4,968  3.72 
Source:  See text. 
Singapore and Hong Kong is considered trade with developed countries. 
The quantitative importance of  considering export trade via Singapore 
and Hong Kong trade with developed countries is highlighted by the fact 
that, if they were considered an LDC destination, then only 3.7 percent 
of  HOS exports (and 36.6 percent of HOS exports excluding rubber) to 
LDCs would be to destinations besides Singapore and Hong Kong. The 
value of  all HOS exports to LDCs excluding Singapore and Hong Kong 
in 197  1 was $16.75 million.30 
Table 5.15 shows that labor  requirements for exports to developed 
countries are virtually the  same as labor  requirements for  exports to 
less developed countries. Exports to less developed countries also require 
22  percent  more  skill-days  and  more  capital  (by  two  out  of  three 
measures)  than  exports to developed countries. If  processed NRB in- 
dustries are excluded, as also shown in table 5.15, exports to developed 
countries require less labor, skills, and capital (by every measure)  than 
exports to less developed countries. Table 5.15  Direct Factor Requirements per Unit of  DVA by Trade Destination or Origin (per Million Rupiahs of Domestic Value 
Added) 
Total  Electricity  Energy 
Man-Days  Skill-Days  Horsepower  (  Kwh 1  (  RP 000 1 
Trade Origin 
or Destination  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
Exportable HOS Manufacturing lndustries 
Developed countries  2,176  1,630  1,166  1,256  7.14  8.52  2,384  2,434  45.11  45.22 
Japan  1,398  1,359  434  400  4.05  3.85  2,432  2,434  44.72  44.93 
Singapore and Hong Kong  2,259  2,085  1,460  1,723  5.35  9.33  5,822  4,261  49.63  42.41 
Other DCs  2,327  1,541  1,250  1,316  8.31  9.45  1,448  1,796  43.97  46.28 
Less developed countries  2,149  2,105  1,421  1,472  9.72  12.42  2,427  2,892  30.73  52.90 
ASEAN except Singapore  3,233  2,501  726  913  5.65  10.59  1,475  1,705  48.90  60.75 
South Korea and Taiwan  3,197  1,368  484  2,073  5.45  24.53  681  1,402  26.18  73.99 
Socialist countries  2,492  2,139  2,558  2,478  7.88  5.96  7,310  9,168  15.08  15.84 
Other LDCs  1,392  2,305  1,449  629  12.77  3.88  1,338  758  26.86  40.98 
Import-Competing HOS Manufacturing Industries 
89.61  94.10 
Japan  793  716  1,454  1,502  16.36  14.54  4,176  4,983  98.89  105.17 
Singapore and Hong Kong  1,164  1,162  1,538  1,541  11.69  11.71  7,650  7,680  68.81  68.66 
Other DCs  1,066  1,017  1,562  1,706  22.64  22.41  3,200  4,246  90.55  97.66 
Less developed countries  1,177  921  1,202  1,413  14.24  11.18  2,617  4,842  89.30  95.82 
ASEAN except Singapore  1,124  1,028  1,294  1,505  21.95  13.01  1,359  4,364  85.61  136.84 
1,225  1,303  10.34  10.83  5,951  6,899  122.82  127.90  South Korea and Taiwan  889  741 
Socialist countries  1,281  945  1,117  1,406  8.95  9.96  2,278  3,061  87.23  72.98 
76.48  71.88  Other LDCs  1,201  1,038  1,253  1,535  18.05  14.21  3,142  8,283 
Developed countries  994  946  1,523  1,603  18.76  17.54  4,264  5,211 
Source:  Author’s computations as described in  text. 
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For importable industries, imports from less developed countries are 
estimated to require over 18 percent more labor than imports from de- 
veloped  countries and less capital by every measure; both the skill-day 
data  and  the  share of  white-collar  in  total  labor  supplied  indicate  a 
greater  abundance of  skills required in imports from developed  coun- 
tries  than  in  imports  from  less  developed  countries.  The  estimated 
capital/labor ratios for products competing with imports from developed 
countries are 1.56, 1.93, and  1.19 times those for products  competing 
with imports from less developed countries, according to the horsepower, 
electricity, and energy proxies, respectively. 
When processed NRB industries are excluded, the factor requirement 
estimates are mixed for importables competing against various sources. 
Imports  from developed  countries now require  more labor as well  as 
more skill and capital  (by two of  three measures)  than imports from 
less developed  countries.  If  Singapore and Hong Kong are considered 
LDCs,  however,  labor requirements  of  imports  from  that  group  will 
again exceed those of  imports from DCs ( 1,062 versus 889). 
The HOS model of  trade with many commodities and countries pre- 
dicts that noncompeting imports would utilize more of  a country’s scarce 
resource  and less of  its abundant resource than competing imports  or 
other tradables. Table 5.16 clearly supports this contention. Noncompet- 
ing imports would require only about one-fifth the labor per unit of  DVA 
that is required in importable  sectors. Furthermore, noncompeting im- 
ports from DCs embody slightly less labor per unit of  DVA than imports 
from LDCS.~~ 
Table 5.16  Direct Labor Requirements in Noncom- 
peting HOS Activities by Import Origin 
Origin 
Man-Days per  Man-Days per 




Singapore and Hong Kong 
Other DCs 
ASEAN except Singapore 
South Korea and Taiwan 
Socialist countries 
Other LDCs 





















Source:  Author’s computations as described in text. 
aIncluding socialist countries. 218  MarkM.Pitt 
5.4.4 
For computing direct and home goods indirect factor requirements for 
Indonesian  HOS tradable classifications, total man-day  labor require- 
ments  are the only measure of  factor use  available. Even  if  data on 
horsepower or energy consumption were available for home goods activi- 
ties, they would be poor measures of  the capital services provided in 
these predominantly service and agricultural sectors. Direct and home 
goods  indirect  labor  requirements  per  million  rupiahs  of  direct  and 
home goods indirect value added for various classifications of  Indonesian 
HOS tradables are presented in table 5.17. There is only a minor differ- 
ence between the direct and the direct plus indirect results. Exportable 
labor requirements fall slightly, while those of  importable activities re- 
main practically constant. This implies that home goods labor require- 
ments are close to those of  importables. In summary, these  estimates 
provide results that mirror those from the analysis of  direct requirements 
only. 
Direct Plus Indirect Home Goods Requirements 
5.4.5 
The HOS  factor  proportions  explanation of  trade predicts,  among 
other things, that a labor-abundant  country like Indonesia will import 
commodities with  a  higher  capital/labor  ratio  than  those  it  exports. 
In particular, with balanced trade, it predicts that Indonesia will be a 
net exporter of  labor and a net importer of  capital. The net factor con- 
tent of  trade, the statistic necessary to test this proposition, measures the 
net factor content of  a representative basket of  exports and competing 
imports leaving the trade balance unchanged. To correctly test the HOS 
proposition,  trade  flows  should  be  partitioned  between  less  labor- 
abundant and more labor-abundant areas. Since Indonesia probably lies 
near the bottom of  a ranking of  all countries by capital/labor ratios, it 
might be  expected that  the Indonesian net  factor  content  of  trade to 
every broad grouping of  countries will reflect a net export of  labor. 
The conversion of  factor requirements per unit of  DVA into interna- 
tional value-added terms for reasons explained in chapter l was accom- 
plished by  applying the calculated ER  Ps. In aggregating exportable and 
importable industries for the net factor content of  trade calculation, the 
weighting system used is the actual international value-added content of 
the 1971 basket of  competing imports and exports. The resulting statis- 
tic thus differs from the calculated factor requirements at domestic prices 
by both the prices used and the system of  weights. 
An examination of  the IVA columns of  table 5.13 reveals that, with 
balanced trade, Indonesia is clearly a net exporter of  labor and a net 
importer of  capital and skills. The capital/labor  ratio of  her imports is 
from six to fourteen times that of  her exports, depending on the capital 
Net Factor Content of  Trade Table 5.17  Direct and Home  Goods Indirect Labor Requirements by Trade Destination or  Origin (Total Man-Days per Million 
Rupiahs of  Direct and Home Goods Indirect Domestic Value Added) 
Developed Countries  Less Developed Countriesa 
South  Social- 
Total,  Singapore  ASEAN  Korea  ist 
HOS  Manufacturing  All  and  Other  Except  and  Coun-  Other 
Sectors  Countries  Total  Japan  Hong Kong  DCs  Total  Singapore  Taiwan  tries  LDCs 
All Sectors in Tradable Classification 
Exportable sectors 
Per DVA  1,990  1,989  1,270  2,092  2,129  1,975  2,865  2,864  2,234  1,221 
Per NA  2,060  2,056  1,175  1,937  2,188  2,093  2,240  1,676  1,894  2,154 
Per DVA  1,038  998  816  1,142  1,057  1,171  1,122  964  1,276  1,184 
Per IVA  1,245  1,208  1,103  1,699  1,183  1,447  1,213  1,318  1,744  1,264 
Import-competing sectors 
Processed NRB Sectors Excluded 
Exportable sectors 
Per DVA  1,514  1,503  1,241  1,916  1,425  1,932  2,242  1,295  1,978  2,081 
Per IVA  1,623  1,625  1,057  1,847  1,533  1,711  1,588  1,528  1,811  1,378 
Per DVA  960  961  749  1,140  1,016  924  1,108  835  951  1,036 
Per IVA  1,222  1,224  1,115  1,696  1,194  1,143  1,731  1,188  1,231  1,099 
Import-competing sectors 
Source:  Same as table 5.11. 
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measure used. With processed  NRB industries excluded, the estimated 
capital/labor  ratios of  imports range from four to eighteen times that of 
exports.  Imports also embody 65 percent more skill-days than exports 
and  more  than three times  as many  skill-days  per  man-day  of  direct 
labor,  a  result  not  significantly altered  by  the exclusion  of  processed 
NRB sectors. 
Table 5.18 provides  the data needed for bilateral  tests  of  the HOS 
propositions with respect to the net factor content of  trade. There it is 
seen that for all nine trade destinations and origins specified Indonesia 
is a net exporter of  labor. For all three measures of  capital Indonesia is 
a net importer of  capital in trade with all nine destinations, with the sole 
exception of  the electricity consumption measure in trade with socialist 
countries.  In addition,  Indonesia  is  a  net  importer of  skill-days from 
eight of  nine trading areas, socialist countries again being the exception. 
When processed NRB industries are excluded from the calculations, the 
results are nearly the same as those based on the full set of  HOS tradable 
sectors; however, the two exceptions noted above disappear. 
The results including both direct and indirect labor requirements and 
value  added  at international prices  are found in  table  5.17.  There it 
may be seen that  exports embody more labor than competing imports 
regardless of  the inclusion or exclusion of  processed NRB sectors. Bi- 
lateral  tests using  all HOS manufacturing  sectors  yield similar  results 
for trade with both developed and less developed countries but, if  raw- 
material-based  sectors  are  excluded,  not  for  trade  with  Japan  and 
ASEAN countries except Singapore. 
5.5  Factor Proportions and the Height of  Protection 
In this  section  the influence of  the trade regime on the commodity 
composition of  trade is examined.  If  the levels of  protection  provided 
vary among industries, the commodity composition of  trade, and hence 
its factor composition, are likely to be affected. 
To test this proposition, we again aggregate importable industries by 
three levels of  protection.  It would  be expected  that, the closer an in- 
dustry lies to Indonesia’s comparative advantage, the less protection  is 
needed  to  enable it to produce domestically.  Thus it  is  expected  that 
least-protected industries would be the least capital- and skill-intensive. 
Factor requirements data for each of  the three groups are presented in 
table 5.19, weighted in the same manner as direct factor requirements. 
Note  that  the  only  direct  absolute  factor  requirement  that  changes 
monotonically over the three groups is skill-days. But two capital-labor 
ratios,  electricity  per  man-day  and  energy  per  man-day,  rise  mono- 
tonically.  It is interesting that industries with medium protection  have 
the greatest absolute labor and capital requirements (by every measure). Table 5.18  Direct  Factor Requirements per Unit  of  IVA by  Trade Destination or  Origin (per Million Rupiahs of  International 
Value  Added) 
Developed countries 
Japan 
Singapore and Hong Kong 
Other DCs 
ASEAN except Singapore 
South Korea and Taiwan 
Socialist countries 
Other LDCs 
Less developed countries 
Developed countries 
Japan 
Singapore and Hong Kong 
Other DCs 
ASEAN except Singapore 
South Korea and Taiwan 
Socialist countries 
Other LDCs 





































Exportable HOS Manufacturing  Sectors 
1,800  1,928  6.99  4.65  4,352  6,113 
1,693  1,639  6.33  5.77  3,038  3,274 
8,351  8,517  2,174  2,255  3.72  3.65 
1,653  1,730  8.41  5.23  2,832  4,759 
2,043  1,961  6.98  5.03  4,762  6,648 
1,627  1,366  7.88  5.28  1,612  2,848 
746  1,108  6.33  11.17  721  903 
2,286  2,280  5.20  4.39  7,771  8,628 
1,899  1,106  10.30  6.25  615  1,589 
Import-Competing HOS Manufacturing  Sectors 
13,069  14,398  3,172  3,395  39.71  41.75 
3,231  3,411  33.02  34.00  15,409  16,650 
3,851  3,863  43.31  43.46  15,725  15,788 
3,018  3,292  43.40  46.69  11,105  12,596 
1,960  2,594  24.25  30.75  10,309  17,652 
1,814  3,446  25.12  33.76  5,455  16,336 
2,164  2,268  26.91  28.70  20,141  22,319 
1,950  2,459  21.35  28.66  7,710  11,988 





































Source:  Author’s computations as described in  text. 
Note: Col. a: All sectors in tradable classification. 
col. b: Processed NRB sectors  excluded. 222  MarkM. Pitt 
Table 5.19  Direct Factor Requirements per Unit of  DVA and Height of 
Protection 
Importables 
~~~  ~ 
All  With  With  With 
Export-  HOS  Lowest  Medium  Highest 
Factor Requirements  ables  Imports  Protection  Protection  Protection 
Per Million Rupiahs of  Domestic Value Added 
Total man-days  2,175  1,038  1,130  1,326  752 
Skill-days  1,175  1,451  1,225  1,200  1,958 
Total horsepower  7.23  17.66  27.20  24.74  6.26 
Electric motor horsepower  2.46  7.99  7.35  17.43  2.05 
Electricity (kwh)  2,386  3,886  3,105  5,524  3,791 
Energy (Rp 000)  44.59  91.42  81.85  103.19  90.84 
Electricity per man-day  1.10  3.74  2.75  4.17  5.04 
Skill-days per man-day  0.54  1.40  1.08  1.02  2.60 
Energy (Rp) per man-day  20.50  88.07  72.43  77.82  120.80 
Ratios of  LDC to DC Factor Requirement@ 
Total man-days  1.184  1.024  1.104  1.115 
Skill-days  0.789  0.999  0.711  0.863 
Total horsepower  0.759  0.928  0.343  1.137 
Electric motor horsepower  0.366  0.288  0.198  1.237 
Electricity (kwh)  0.614  0.182  0.343  1.819 
Energy (Rp 000)  0.996  0.859  0.985  1.157 
Source: Author's computations as described in text. 
aMore precisely, ratios of factor requirements of products competing with imports 
from LDCs to factor requirements of products competing with imports from DCs. 
Most-protected industries,  which  might  be  expected to be  inefficient, 
nevertheless seem to use both less labor and less capital to produce one 
million rupiahs of  DVA than do the other groups.32 However, the cor- 
rect measure of  efficiency would be in terms of  factor requirements per 
unit of  IVA, because otherwise the inefficiency of  highly protected in- 
dustries is disguised by  their inflated domestic value added. Using this 
measure  (see table 5.20),  note that  the most-protected industries use 
more labor, skills, and capital (by two out of  the three measures) than 
do other  import-competing sectors. Exportables  use  by  far the  most 
labor, but they use much smaller inputs of  capital than any importable 
group. 
An explanation is possible for the odd behavior of  some of  the factor 
proportions data of  table 5.19. The least-protected group is composed of 
only six industries, which include two capital goods industries, electrical 
machinery  and  apparatus  (  109)  and  shipbuilding, boatbuilding,  and 
repairing  (1  14), as well  as one activity on the margin of  being non- 
competing, fertilizer  (84).  These  industries are very  capital-intensive 
according to our capital proxy measures and, because their volume of 
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computation. It also seems likely that in the case of  electrical machinery 
and  shipbuilding imported  commodities may  differ  substantially from 
domestically produced  commodities. Therefore  the data for the least- 
protected group should be viewed with caution. For the most-protected 
group, it  appears  likely  that  the  capital measures,  particularly horse- 
power, are poor measures of  real capital services provided to the activi- 
ties involved. For example, the horsepower (and other capital) require- 
ments in the  drug,  motor vehicle assembly, cosmetics, cigarettes, and 
storage and dry battery industries are very low compared with their rela- 
tive  capital  intensity  in  other  countries. Probably the capital require- 
ments data available do not adequately measure the more complex types 
of  capital used in these industries. The same may be true for all activi- 
ties; thus my  capital requirements estimates generally should be viewed 
with some caution. 
As would be expected, table 5.19 shows that capital requirements of 
products competing with LDCs are lower than capital requirements of 
products  competing with  DCs  for  both  medium-  and  least-protected 
sectors.  The  difference is  particularly  striking for  the  electric motor 
horsepower and electricity consumption measures, which represent more 
sophisticated capital than the other measures. The contrary results for 
the most-protected industries are perhaps also due to the inadequacy of 
the capital proxies used in measuring the flow of  real capital services 
to these sectors. 
It is  also of  interest to check whether new investment by  activity is 
related to the height of  protection. Table 5.21 presents data on fixed 
capital formation obtained from manufacturing surveys, which, though 
limited  to two years, permit some tentative observations to be  made. 
The data indicate that in  1972-73  fixed capital formation per unit of 
DVA in import-competing sectors was  24 percent higher than  in ex- 
portable  sectors.  The  difference  in  capital  formation  between  least- 
Table 5.20  Direct Factor Requirements per  Unit of  WA and Height of 
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With  With  With 
Lowest  Medium  Highest 
Protection  Protection  Protection 
~~ 
373  1,565  1,794 
721  2,250  7,780 
28.59  49.22  32.77 
17.83  37.63  10.15 
10,139  10,673  19,746 
85.46  185.14  468.54 
Source:  Author's  computations as described in text. 224  MarkM.Pitt 




Excluding rubber milling (94). 
Sectors with lowest protection 
Sectors with medium protection 
Sectors with highest protection 
Excluding cigarettes (65) 
Negative IVA sectors 
Excluding fertilizer (84) and electrical machinery (109) 
New Fixed Capital 
Formation per 











Source:  Biro Pusat Statistik,  Statistik industri  (1972,  1973). 
aNurnbers refer  to input-output  code. 
protected  and medium-protected  sectors is not very striking. If  the fer- 
tilizer  (84) and  electrical  machinery  (  109)  industries  are excluded 
from least-protected groups, the rate of  capital formation falls markedly. 
Rice milling predominates  in the remaining figure. Most-protected  in- 
dustries  have  a  lower  rate  of  capital  formation  than  both  least-  and 
medium-protected  industries. Since they are unable to export, growth in 
these industries is constrained by the size of  the domestic market. Some 
of  the largest  industries  in  the group-cigarettes  and motor  vehicles, 
for example-also  have new capital formation strictly controlled or pro- 
hibited by the government investment board. 
Industries  with  negative IVA are found to have the highest  rate of 
fixed  capital  formation  among  all  groups  investigated.  Since negative 
IVA implies that domestic production is absolutely inefficient, the indi- 
cation is that the trade regime is providing above-average  incentives to 
the least desirable activities. 
5.6  Summary and Conclusions 
In examining  the  factor  requirements  of  bundles  of  manufactured 
tradables containing one million rupiahs of  DVA, it was found that HOS 
exportable  manufacturing  industries  required  twice  as  much  labor  as 
importable  industries  but  substantially  less  capital  and  skills.  When 
trade was partitioned  between  developed  and less developed  countries 
for origins and destinations, it was not possible to conclude definitively 
that Indonesian  exportable  production  destined  for  DCs had  a lower 
capital-labor  ratio  than  that  bound  for  LDCs,  although  the evidence 225  Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment in Indonesia 
pointed in that direction. The reason for the ambiguity hinged on inade- 
quate proxies for capital and the question of  how trade with Hong Kong 
and  Singapore  should  be treated.  However, in  every  case  skill-labor 
ratios were lower for exports to DCs than to LDCs. Second, my  results 
did indicate that the capital-labor ratio of  imports from developed coun- 
tries exceeded that of  imports from less developed countries. 
In comparing the factor requirements of  baskets of  tradables contain- 
ing equal quantities of  value added at international prices, it was found 
that Indonesia was clearly  a net exporter of  labor and net importer of 
capital  and skills in  her trade in HOS manufactures;  when trade was 
partitioned between developed  and less developed countries, the above 
result still held in every case. 
The results  above hold  irrespective  of  whether  factor  requirements 
are measured by direct or direct plus home goods indirect coefficients. 
An examination of  the height  of  protection  and  factor proportions 
found that when importable activities were partitioned into three groups 
based on their effective protection, capital/labor  ratios were higher  (by 
two of  three measures)  the greater the effective protection  afforded the 
group. The most-protected industries used only 61 percent of  the labor 
of  all least-protected industries, though industries with medium protec- 
tion used more labor than least-protected industries. 
Eleven  out of  fifteen HOS manufacturing  sectors that had negative 
rates of  protection  were  exportable  sectors,  and on average HOS ex- 
portables  received  negative  effective protection.  On  the  other  hand, 
substantial protection was afforded importable industries. Indeed, eight 
HOS  importable  industries were  found  to have  negative  international 
value  added. Noncompeting  importables had  low ERPs. Thus the in- 
centive system was definitely biased against exports and favored import- 
able industries. 
An important result of  this research is an estimate of  the employment 
trade-off  implicit  in  Indonesia’s  choice of  trade  strategy.  It has been 
noted that, since the conclusion of  a period of  dramatic trade liberaliza- 
tion in  1971, the Indonesian  trade regime has tended to become more 
restrictive.  In particular,  levels  of  protection  seem  to have  increased 
recently  in response to emerging excess capacity in certain industries. 
The employment  cost  of  following  an  import  substitution  strategy  in 
Indonesia is severe. One million dollars of  increased value added from 
manufactured  exports generates 57 percent  more  employment than an 
equivalent reduction in competing imports. If  manufactured exports were 
to increase by  15  percent  per  year,  a  rate of  growth  that  should be 
readily attainable,33 the employment necessary to produce these exports 
would rise from its 1971 level of  374,000 full-time equivalents to almost 
1.7 million by  1981. This increase would  be enough to employ  about 
11 percent of  the projected growth in the labor force over that period. Appendix 
Table 5.A.1  Protection in Indonesian Manufacturing, 1971 
Input- 
output 
Code  Sector 
Nominal Protection  Effective Protection  Trade 





















Canning and preserving of meat 
Dairy products 
Canning and preserving of  fruits and vegetables 
Canning and preserving of fish and other seafoods 
Coconut oil and cooking oil 
Vegetable and animal oils and fats 
Rice milling, cleaning, and polishing 
Wheat flour and other grain mill products 
Dried cassava and tapioca flour 
Bread and bakery products 
Noodles, macaroni, and similar products 
Sugar refining 




Other food products n.e.c. 
Alcoholic beverages 






-  10.0 
-  10.0 
-13.0 
-  18.0 
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67.8 
-  12.3 
-  14.7 
471.8 































HOS-X Table 5.A.l-continued 
hput- 
output 
Code  Sector 
Nominal Protection  Effective Protection  Trade 



























Textile bleaching, printing, dyeing, and finishing, excluding batik 
Batik industries 
Knitting industries 
Made-up textile goods, excluding wearing apparel 
Wearing apparel, excluding footwear 
Carpets, rugs, ropes, and other 
Tanneries and leather finishing 
Leather products, excluding footwear industries 
Footwear of  leather 
Sawmills, planing, and other wood processing 
Wood and cork products 
Furniture and fixtures, excluding those primarily of  metal 
Pulp, paper, and cardboard 
Paper products 
Printing, publishing, and allied industries 
Basic industrial chemicals, excluding fertilizers 
Fertilizers and pesticides 
Paints, varnishes, and lacquers 
Drugs and medicines 
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HOS-MC Table 5.A.l-continued 
Input- 
output 
Code  Sector 
Nominal Protection  Effective Protection  Trade 



























Other chemical industries 
Petroleum refining 
Other petroleum and coal industries 
Tires and tubes 
Smoking and remilling of  rubber 
Other rubber products 
Plasticware 
Ceramics and earthenwares 
Glass and glass products 
Structural clay products 
Cement 
Other nonmetallic mineral products 
Iron and steel 
Nonferrous basic metals 
Cutlery, hand tools, and general hardware 
Furniture and fixtures, primarily of  metal 
Structural metal products 
Other fabricated metal products 
Nonelectrical machinery 
Electrical machinery and apparatus 
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HOS-NC Table S.A.1-continued 
Input- 
output  Nominal Protection  Effective Protection  Trade 
Code  Sector  (pd/pw -  1) x loo  (DVA/ZYA  -  1) x 100  Classification 
11  1  Electrical appliances and housewares  44.8  96.4  HOS-NC 
112  Accumulator and dry battery industries  47.0  193.1  HOS-MC 
113  Other electrical apparatus and supplies and repairing  12.7  10.3  HOS-NC 
114  Ship and boat building and repairing  4.7  1.5  HOS-MC 
115  Railroad equipment  .2  -  3.5  HOS-NC 
116  Motor vehicles  110.0  525.7  HOS-MC 
117  Motorcycles, bicycles, and other vehicles  55.8  204.3  HOS-MC 
119  Aircraft  9.6  - 1.9  HOS-NC 
120  Professional and scientific equipment  8.3  18.4  HOS-NC 
121  Photographic and optical goods  13.8  16.1  HOS-NC 
122  Watches and clocks  59.1  Nonproduced  HOS-NC 
123  Jewelry and related articles  21.5  101.2  HOS-MC 
124  Musical instruments  41.0  151.1  HOS-NC 
125  Sporting and athletic goods  48.4  419.9  HOS-MC 
126  Other manufacturing industries  0  -13.3  HOS-X 
172  Kretek (clove cigarettes)  0  -23.1  HOS-X 
173  Other nonproduced manufacturing  38.0  Nonproduced  HOS-NC 
118  Repairing of  motorized and nonrnotorized vehicles  Home good  Home good  Home good 
Note : HOS-MC =  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  import-competing tradable. 
HOS-NC =  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson  noncompeting importable. 
HOS-X  =  Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson exportable. 
NRB-X  =  Natural resource based exportable. Table 5.A.2  Labor Reqairements, Trade Pattern, and Wages in Indonesian 
Manufacturing, 1971 
Labor Requirements 
(Man-Days per  Million 
Rupiahs of  DVA)  Wages  Tradeb with  Tradeb 
per  DCs  with 
Industry  Direct plus  Man-Day  (Millions  DCs 
































































































































































































































89 Table 5.A.kontinued 
Labor Requirements 
(Man-Days per  Million 
Rupiahs of  DVA)  wages  Tradeb with  Tradeb 
per  DCs  with 
Industry  Direct plus  Man-Day  (Millions  DCs 





















































































































































































Source: Pitt  1977. 
*Less than 0.5 million rupiahs. 
See  table 5.A.1  for name of  each industry. 
bTrade refers to exports for exportables and imports for importables. 
Notes 
1. For a complete review of  Indonesian economic development,  see Booth and 
McCawley  ( 1980) and the “Survey of  Recent Developments” found in each issue 
of  the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. 
2.  The Jakarta cost-of-living index is presented  in table 5.10. 232  MarkM.Pitt 
3.  Determining  the  value  of  Indonesia’s  manufactured  exports  is  complicated 
by  the probkm of  defining a  “manufactured”  export  and by  the problem  of re- 
export.  A  recent  analysis  by  Arndt  (1977)  of  the  Indonesian  trade  minister’s 
claim  that  1976  industrial  exports  totaled  $220 million  is an enlightening exam- 
ple.  After  eliminating processed  goods such  as sawn  timber,  vegetable  oils,  and 
crumb rubber,  Arndt noted  that  much  of  the SITC classification  “manufactured 
goods” was  accounted  for by  tin,  unwrought  and in bars,  and most of  the  $53.2 
million  of  “machinery  and  transportation  equipment”  consisted  of  reexport.  The 
items that he claims can plausibly be considered manufactured exports totaled only 
$9.6 million out of  $2.4 billion in nonoil exports in 1976. 
4.  The data also  indicate  that  females  accounted  for most  of  the  increase  in 
manufacturing employment over this period. 
5. There are some  serious  pitfalls  in  comparing  Indonesian  census  data over 
time.  Gavin Jones  (1978) provides a  number  of  alternative measures of  employ- 
ment growth by making various corrections to the census data. 
6. This phenomenon  was first examined by Papanek  (1974). 
7. The data suffer from a number of  weaknesses. First,  average manufacturing 
wages  may  have  changed because  the commodity  composition  of  manufacturing 
changed  somewhat over this period.  Second, because  of  the highly variable  rates 
of  capacity utilization  over  the period,  the data may not represent  “payment per 
year of  labor services,” since employees may have worked part time. The problem 
of  payment in kind does not appear important because the data supposedly include 
such payment valued  at market prices.  The problem  of  manufacturing’s changing 
commodity  mix  was  partially  resolved  by  calculating real  wages for one  manu- 
facturing  subsector  (textiles). As  a whole,  the textile  real wage demonstrates the 
same downward slide as manufacturing  except for a larger decline in textile wages 
in  1965-67.  This drop may represent  the extremely  low levels of  capacity utiliza- 
tion  of  those  years. 
8. This is  also  true  for a  time  series  on household  servant  wages in  Jakarta. 
Papanek  (1974, p. 12) notes that real wages on estates  in  1938 were probably  15 
percent higher than in any subsequent year. 
9. However,  aid  foreign  exchange  (Devisa  Kredit)  continued  to  receive  a 
special rate of  Rp 326 until December  1970. 
10.  The price-level deflator is the cost-of-living index for a government worker 
in Jakarta linked with the sixty-two-item Jakarta cost-of-living index. 
11. The ratio of  the black-market rate to the EER, may not be a good indicator 
of the EER,’s  overvaluation  for at least two reasons.  For one thing,  pressure on 
the black-market  rate may come from a desire to export  capital  abroad when  it 
is legally  prohibited.  In the case  of  Indonesia, the  leaps in the black-market  rate 
in late 1959 and early  1960 were in part due to severe government actions against 
Chinese  entrepreneurs,  which  resulted  in  a  surge of  Indo-Chinese  capital  out  of 
the country.  Second, the  black-market  rate reflects exchange restrictions not only 
on exports but also on imports.  Given an EER for exports, the black-market  rate 
would  be higher the greater  the restrictions on imports. 
12. A  theory  of  smuggling  that  explains  the  simultaneous  existence  of  legal 
trade,  smuggling,  and  price  disparity  is  found  in  Pitt  (1978). The  theory  pre- 
sented  there considers legal  trade  and smuggling  as  activities  carried  out by  the 
same firms. A large share of  smuggling takes the form of  misinvoiced, misgraded, 
and misweighed  legal  trade.  The greater  the legal  export, the easier it is to hide 
smuggling from enforcement  agencies and therefore  the less costly smuggling will 
be.  Thus legal trade can be viewed as an input into the smuggling  activity.  Price 233  Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment in Indonesia 
disparity exists because firms will bid the price  of  the smuggled commodity above 
its legal  trade return  as long  as profit  can  be made  in  combined  smuggling  and 
legal trade. 
13. Lee  and Pitt  (1978)  found that new weaving firms in Indonesia  are much 
more  capital-intensive  than  older  firms.  The  newest  quintile  of  firms  in  their 
sample  had  a  capital/labor  ratio  two  and  one-half  times  as great  as the oldest 
quintile of  firms and 31 percent greater than average. 
14. The  table  also  serves  as  the  basis  for  the  sectoral  disaggregation  of  the 
employment  calculations  that  follow.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  171-sector 
input-output  table for Indonesia used  in this research is not identical  to that pub- 
lished by the Biro Pusat Statistik  (1976). In the published  175-sector table, small- 
scale  agriculture  processing  activities  are considered  separate sectors  or are ag- 
gregated  into the NRB agricultural  activity. 
15. Had  the data been  available,  price  comparisons would  have  been  used  to 
check nominal  protection  estimates in all sectors. 
16. Large quantities  of  cloves  ($30.4 million  in  1971)  are  imported  for use 
in  the  kretek  (clove cigarette)  industry. 
17. MPO is the  acronym  for menghitung pajak orang-lain, literally,  “to count 
the tax of  another person.” The name is derived from the fact that the seller of a 
taxed  commodity usually withholds the tax on behalf of  the purchaser. 
18. Richard  and Peggy Musgrave, in an unpublished  memorandum, provide the 
following  analysis: 
“Assume that for a firm the only cost is the price of  merchandise purchased. The 
profits tax T equals: 
where P is profits,  t  the profit  tax  rate, and Z the MPO credit  claimed. Further- 
more, assume that profits are estimated by a margin m on sales S, so 
and that sales are determined as a markup u on  cost C, so 
Cost can be  presumptively determined on the basis of  2, so that 
where g is  the MPO tax  rate. Thus, substituting and solving for T, one obtains 
T=tP-Z 
P =  mS, 
S=(l+u)C. 
c =  z/g 
and since  -  7 
Im(l 
+
 “8’ -  m, - 
ux-  IM  then  T =  t 
1-m  - 
When  g =  .02, the term in the brackets  is  positive when  rn exceeds  1.96 percent. 
Since  rn  would  typically  be  above  that,  the  tax  increases  with  Z  and  the  firm 
would decrease its tax liability  by underreporting  Z its MPO credit.” 
19. The special exchange rates for cotton and weaving yarn have been adjusted 
since 1970 as follows: 
Beginning  Raw Cotton Exchange  Exchange Rate of General 
Date  Rate per US.  $1  Foreign Exchange per U.S.  $1 
3 July 1969  Rp 170 
23 Feb. 1971  Rp 215 
18 Jan. 1972  Rp 271 
Rp 326 
Rp 378 
Rp 415 234  Mark M. Pitt 
Weaving Yarn  Ex-PL 480 
Beginning  Exchange Rate  Exchange Rate of  General 
Date  per U.S.  $I  Foreign Exchange per U.S.  $1 
5 July 1969  Rp 125  Rp 326 
3 May 1972  Rp 150  Rp 415 
20. The rebate schedule was as follows: 
Country of Origin  Rebate per US.  $I 
United States and Canada  Rp 60 
Netherlands,  West Germany,  Rp 40 
France, Belgium, and the 
United Kingdom 
Australia and New Zealand  Rp 30 
Untied aid foreign exchange  Rp 30 
from United States 
Japan  Rp 20 
21. These  categories  accounted  for  nearly  20 percent  of  imports  (excluding 
imports of oil companies)  in fiscal year  1971/72. 
22.  This does not imply  that underinvoicing  does not occur,  only  that it does 
not seem to bias the estimates. Special costs associated with illegal transactions, such 
as side payments  to customs officials, may be offsetting the benefits of  undervalu- 
ation. 
23.  Textile  bleaching,  printing,  dyeing,  and  finishing  except  batik  (68),  a 
sector  for which  there is  no trade  attributed  by  the  1971  input-output  table,  is 
nonetheless considered  a tradable.  The absence of  any reported  trade in the sector 
is  attributable to the  inflexibility of  the  trade statistics.  All textiles,  printed  and 
dyed or not,  enter  as weaving  sector  imports with  no attribution of  the printing 
and dyeing activity to that  sector.  The sector  is considered  import-competing be- 
cause  it  is  protected  both  by  higher  tariffs  on  the  import of  dyed  and printed 
textiles  relative  to undyed  and unprinted  textiles  and because  there are prohibi- 
tions on the  import of  certain varieties of  textiles only if  they  are printed. 
24.  Examination  of  trade data for years  adjacent to 1971 indicates that railroad 
and  aircraft  equipment  imports  in  1971  were  less  than  average  and that those 
sectors should be classified as noncompeting imports rather than import-competing. 
Fertilizer had a  1971 value of  T that was borderline,  0.81, and in light of  rapidly 
growing  productive  capacity  in  this  sector,  fertilizer  was  classified  as  import- 
competing. 
25. Traditionally, a substantial share of  of  crudely milled Indonesian rubber has 
been  exported  to Singapore for remilling  and reexport.  However, prohibitions  on 
the export  of  lower grades of  rubber, in effect in  1971, diverted most rubber  ex- 
ports through the smoking and remilling sector. 
26.  It is not clear to which trade classification petroleum  refining would belong. 
Most  exports  are refined  by-products  for which  sufficient market does not  exist 
in  Indonesia,  while  imports  consist  of  more  basic  products  such  as  kerosene. 
According  to Johnson  (1977, p.  43), most of  the refined exports  consist of  low- 
sulfur waxy residue.  With  trade in  petroleum  products  under  the control of  the 
state petroleum  monopoly,  PERTAMINA, it may be that, under  an efficient pat- 
tern  of  resource  allocation,  the  value  of  T  might  be positive  rather than  mar- 
ginally negative. 
27. The survey is  the Survey  Perusahaan  lndustri 1973. Man-days  were  calcu- 
lated  in  the following  manner:  firms reported  the number of  days they  were  in 
operation during each quarter and the number of  employees at the middle of  each 235  Alternative Trade Strategies and Employment in Indonesia 
quarter, and the two figures were multiplied  and summed over the four quarters. 
The detailed  employment data  were  coded  from firm  questionnaires  for this  re- 
search.  Aggregated  data from  the  survey  were  published  as Biro  Pusat  Statistik 
Statistik Zndustri 1973 (2 vols.),  Jakarta  1975. 
28.  Because part-time  operatives may be  more prevalent  than part-time  white- 
collar employees, the first assumption may not be strictly true and operative man- 
days may be overestimated, but not consequentially. 
29. These weights are chosen because  it  is felt that increments in manufactur- 
ing value added would be  more in proportion  to the sectoral composition of  con- 
sumption  than production.  The factor requirements  calculations  therefore  repre- 
sent requirements for incremental units of  domestic value added. 
30. Even if  trade via Singapore and Hong Kong were not of an entrepBt nature, 
it would not be a misspecification to label them developed countries, since only the 
correct  ranking  of  countries  by  factor  endowments  is  of  concern.  Classified as 
LDCs, Singapore and Hong Kong would likely be the best capital-endowed among 
them;  if  classified as DCs they  would  be  among  the  least  well-endowed.  Since 
Indonesia  is near  the bottom of  a  capital-intensity  ranking,  its position  is of  no 
importance  here.  Therefore Singapore  and Hong Kong  can be  considered  devel- 
oped  countries  for both  import and  export  trade.  Any significant  change  in  the 
results  for imports that would come about by  considering  them as LDCs will be 
noted. 
31. Although  this difference is small, the variance of  these sectoral labor coeffi- 
cients is  also small. 
32. This might  possibly be  explained by  the presence of  large economic profits 
earned by  firms in these oligopolistic sectors. 
33. A  IS percent  rate of  growth  of  manufactured  exports  is  small relative to 
the  rate of  growth projected  by  “The Study of  Long-Term Growth Perspectives” 
supervised  by  the  Indonesian  minister  of  state  for  research  and  reported  in 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo  (1977, p. 26). They estimated  a growth rate of  manu- 
factured exports  of  39.2 percent  per  annum  over  the  period  1974-80  and  25.2 
percent  over  1980-85.  Since  they  define  manufactured  exports  much  more nar- 
rowly than here, their projections are not applicable. 
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